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TOWARD SEAPORT RESILIENCE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: 
STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS OF HURRICANE IMPACTS IN GULFPORT (MS) 
AND PROVIDENCE (RI) 
1. Introduction	  
A growing body of research indicates that climate change is having and will continue to have a 
range of impacts on human-environmental systems (IPCC 2012; NRC 2010). Attention must be 
given to reducing vulnerability and increasing the resilience of these systems (Patt 2013; Moser 
and Boykoff 2013). Because the climate-related changes include increased storm activity 
(Emanuel 2013) and a rise in sea levels (Rahmstorf 2010), seaports are expected to be especially 
vulnerable (Becker et al. 2013; McEvoy et al. 2013; Asariotis and Benamara 2012), as many 
ports are -by necessity- located in environmentally sensitive and high-risk locations. Seaports 
and maritime shipping play vital roles in global trade and regional socio-economic stability 
(AAPA 2013; World Bank 2010). With 99% of overseas U.S. trade by weight, carried by ship 
(AAPA 2013), ports are the backbone of the national economy and International trade. Ports 
serve as delivery centers of public goods and critical resources for the region of their 
geographical location, to a wide variety of stakeholders such as public agencies, community 
groups, and private businesses (Hall and Jacobs 2007; Notteboom and Winkelmans 2002) Recent 
projections suggest a potentially crippling increase in asset exposure in each of the world’s 136 
port mega-cities during this century (Nicholls et al. 2008; Lenton et al. 2009; Coumou and 
Rahmstorf 2012). Combined, these new conditions of elevated sea levels plus more frequent and 
intense tropical storms could result in a 10 to 100-fold increase in the likelihood of a major storm 
event (Tebaldi et al. 2012; Grinsted et al. 2013).  
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There is wide consensus that stakeholder engagement and participation will be an essential 
component of adaptation (Wilbanks and Kates 1999; Eakin and Luers 2006) and that the 
assessment of impacts should be conducted on a scale that is aligned with the scale at which 
management occurs (Cash and Moser 2000). Thus, the current research is an academic 
exploration focusing on the causes and consequences of harm and loss for particular peoples and 
places, in this case stakeholders of seaports. It builds on the theory that stakeholder perceptions 
must be considered for effective assessment and management of such consequences (Eakin and 
Luers 2006).  
Understanding the potential impacts of storms for different port stakeholders can help them plan 
for a level of storm preparedness that is more appropriate for the new environmental conditions 
presented by climate change (Koetse and Rietveld 2009). Without such understanding, 
stakeholders are left to plan in a way that does not necessarily account for many indirect costs or 
intangible consequences of such storm events -- impacts that will ultimately be borne by society. 
To plan for a future with more extreme events in coastal areas, decision makers need to 
understand what kinds of impacts result from storms hitting the local port, which stakeholders are 
affected, and how to incorporate stakeholder concerns into the planning process. In this article, 
we thus address the following three questions through case studies of two highly-exposed 
seaports:  
1) How do port stakeholders in Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI) perceive the 
impacts of a major hurricane hitting the port, and 
2) How will internal and external stakeholders bear the costs resulting from a 
hurricane hitting the port? 
3) In what ways are port stakeholders considering the resilience of the port in planning 
and policy? 
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Our study provides a fine-grained analysis of hurricane impacts on seaport stakeholders through 
a review of planning and policy documents, an analysis of interviews, and a review of each port's 
resilience plans. We invited key stakeholders in the port cluster to review and respond to a 
hurricane scenario. We identified and catalogued the wide range of impacts of storm events on 
the port described by interviewees, as well analyzed which stakeholders would bear the cost of 
impacts. We also examined how stakeholder concerns were accounted for in planning and 
policy.  
The target audience for this study is the constellation of planners, practitioners, and decision-
makers in the public and private sectors with responsibility for the formulation and 
implementation of resilience plans and policy for seaports. They include: port planners, coastal 
managers, urban planners, federal agencies, and others. The audience also includes the members 
of the academic community who are concerned about the issues of stakeholder engagement and 
furthering the efficacy of resilience planning. 
Following the Introduction, Section 2 of this paper provides the background and context for the 
study through a discussion of climate adaptation, the climate change challenge for seaports, the 
seaport stakeholder cluster, and seaport resilience planning. We also discuss some of the 
currently applied traditional methods of impact assessment, many of which are either at the 
wrong scale or not suitable for ex ante assessments that decision makers need in order to plan for 
more resilient seaports. In Section 3, we outline our approach and methods for the case studies 
and provide an overview of the ports of Gulfport and Providence. Section 4 reports the results of 
the study as a typology for hurricane impacts, illustrated with examples from key stakeholders 
and the documents reviewed, with an assessment of which stakeholders will likely bear the costs 
of specific impacts. Finally, Section 5 discusses the results in aggregate, addresses each of the 
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three original research questions. Though we did not intend this research as a comparative case 
study, Section 5 also addresses some of the similarities and differences between these two cases. 
We conclude with some implications for policy and a short discussion of the next steps for this 
line of research. 
2. Background	  
2.1. The	  climate	  challenge	  for	  seaports	  
Climate change is accepted by the scientific community as an unequivocal fact (IPCC 2007). 
Impacts of climate change are already being felt by society, and it is likely that impacts will in 
the future affect all sectors of society and have wide-reaching impacts on human health, energy, 
marine environments and fisheries, transportation infrastructure, forests, conservation areas, food 
supplies and global security (IPCC 2007; IPCC 2012; NRC 2010). Recent global projections 
suggest that sea levels could rise by as much as 1.9 meters by 2100 (Schaeffer et al. 2012; 
Vermeer and Rahmstorf 2009), which would exacerbate storm-surge impacts and wave damage 
in many regions (Lin et al. 2012; IPCC 2012) especially if the intensity and frequency of tropical 
storms also increase (Emanuel 2013; Bender et al. 2010). These new conditions pose substantial 
challenges to ports (Asariotis and Benamara 2012; Oh and Reuveny 2010) due to the exposed 
locations of ports in coastal zones, low-lying areas, the life spans of infrastructure assets, and 
their interdependence with trade, shipping and inland transport services that are also climatically 
vulnerable. The coastal or estuarine location of seaports suggests that the mean sea level (MSL) 
rise, higher storm surges and river floods (Tebaldi et al. 2012; Von Storch et al. 2008; Jonkeren 
et al. 2013), increased hurricane intensities/destructiveness (Elsner et al. 2008; Emanuel 2005) 
and potential changes in wave regimes (IPCC 2012) could cause significant damage and 
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operational delays (Haveman and Shatz 2006; EQECAT Inc. 2012; PANYNJ 2012). These 
extreme events cause coastal inundation/erosion, wind hazards and inland floods that can disrupt 
entire transportation networks (USCCRP 2008). Some regions will find that the local sea level 
rise will exceed the global mean, causing additional impacts from business losses due to these 
natural disasters (Esteban et al. 2009; Hallegatte et al. 2011).  
Many ports have already suffered from catastrophic storms even before climate change. Between 
1960-2010, 282 U.S. ports had a named tropical storm pass within 50 kilometers (Figure 1). In 
particular, ports along the U.S. Gulf and East Coasts have been hit directly by hurricanes, with 
damages totaling in the billions of dollars (Blake et al. 2011). Hurricane Katrina caused $100 
million to Mississippi’s ports (PEER 2006) and Hurricane Sandy generated over $50 billion in 
damage to the New York and New Jersey region (EQECAT Inc. 2012) and the Port of New York 
was shut down for over eight days (PANYNJ 2012).  
Figure 1 -- Map of U.S. ports within 50km of named storm 
2.2. Climate	  change	  adaptation	  -­‐	  Overview	  of	  theory	  and	  terms	  
Adapting to the impacts of climate change has become a focus for researchers and the decision 
makers at local, state, national, and International levels (NRC 2010; IPCC 2012), though little 
work has addressed ports specifically. Adaptation, as defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), means “any adjustment in natural or human systems in response to 
actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities” (IPCC 2007). 
The adaptation process incorporates steps that may be iterative, though defining the problem and 
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initial solutions through identifying risks, vulnerabilities, and strategies, is generally a first step. 
This requires an assessment of which stakeholders are at risk and should thus be engaged in the 
adaptation planning process, what the specifics risks and impacts may be, and in what ways 
systems may be vulnerable. Assessing vulnerability has been the subject of a great deal of 
research in the emerging area of climate adaptation (Bierbaum et al. 2013; Preston et al. 2010), 
though approaches remain fragmented (Janssen et al. 2006).  
As represented in (Figure 2), the first steps in the adaptation process in general, and for ports 
specifically, requires the engagement of stakeholders and thus an assessment who should thus be 
engaged in the adaptation planning process, what the specifics risks are, and in what ways the 
port system in vulnerable.  
Before identifying each stakeholder's position, implication and responsibility in this complex 
structure, here is an overview of terminology used in the present research, to establish context: 
Risk is the product of the probability of an event and the damage consequences that result. For 
ports, the risk manifests primarily as a function of exposure to storms and the impacts that result 
from a storm hitting the port.  
Impacts are the effects on natural and human systems of disasters and are a key component of 
vulnerability.  
Vulnerability is defined as, “the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected … 
including the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influences their capacity 
to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover form the adverse affects of physical events” (IPCC 
2012).  
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Capacity is defined as “the combination of all the strengths, attributes, and resources available to 
an individual, community, society, or organization that can be used to achieve established goals” 
(IPCC 2012).  
Exposure, in turn, is defined as “the presence of people, livelihoods, environmental services and 
resources, infrastructure, or economic, social, or cultural assets in places that could be adversely 
affected by physical events and which, thereby, are subject to potential future harm, loss, or 
damage” (IPCC 2012).  
Resilience generally refers to the “ability of a system to absorb disturbance and still retain its 
basic function and structure” (Walker et al. 2006). A large body of research has focused on the 
resilience of natural coastal systems (Adger et al. 2005), due to concerns about the combined 
pressures of human population growth and threats from natural disasters. Resilience is also topic 
of growing interest among researchers in other areas ranging from architectural systems to 
institutional (Eakin and Luers 2006), ecological systems (Walker et al. 2006) and security studies 
(Coaffee and Wood 2006). Resilience theory and natural hazards research provides a lens 
focusing on the problem identification and the implementation of solutions that include disaster 
response and planning (Godschalk 1999; Birkmann et al. 2008; Collier et al. 2010). The National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council defines infrastructure resilience as the ability to reduce the 
magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events (NIAC 2009). The effectiveness of a resilient 
infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly 
recover from a potentially disruptive event (O'Rourke 2007).  
A first step in approaching the climate change adaptation for seaports is establishing a 
framework that provides a visual overview of a complex process. These help guide the 
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adaptation process, allowing researchers and practitioners to better understand the necessary 
steps for building resilience of the systems with which they are particularly concerned (NRC, 
2010; Moser and Ekstrom 2010; Turner et al. 2003; Allison et al. 2009; Birkmann et al. 2013). 
We use the framework represented in Figure 2 to provide context for this research because it 
represents a common and rational approach to planning (Moser and Ekstrom 2010). This 
framework emphasizes the importance of stakeholder engagement in adaption planning. 
Researchers and practitioners increasingly recognize stakeholder engagement as an essential 
component of successful adaptation planning processes and resilience building (Moser and 
Boykoff 2013; Eakin and Luers 2006). Empirical evidence has shown that without support from 
stakeholders, coastal management decisions are unlikely to be successfully implemented 
(Tompkins et al. 2008). Stakeholder input helps assess and identify future socioeconomic 
impacts (Van Kleef et al. 2006) that can result from hurricanes striking at seaports. Assessment 
of these types of impacts, as well as the options for adaptation, are the first steps in the 
adaptation process. Though other research has relied on stakeholder input to assess flood risk 
(Van Kleef et al. 2006), impacts of sea level rise (Poumadère et al. 2008), and the broader 
regional impacts of climate change more generally (Shackley and Deanwood 2002), these types 
of impacts assessments have not been applied for stakeholders of seaports. 
Figure 2 -- Climate adaptation process (NCADAC Draft) 
2.3. What	  is	  seaport	  resilience?	  
When used in reference to a seaport, “resilience” has many different meanings to different types 
of stakeholders. In a case study of the Port of New York and New Jersey, for example, Smythe 
(2013) found large variations in how stakeholders conceptualized the resilience of the port. Some 
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described it in social terms, emphasizing the interconnectedness of different sectors. Others 
thought primarily about the physical infrastructure and the transportation systems’ ability to 
bounce back and recover, and others described it in economic terms, emphasizing the resilience 
of supply chains, and others. In general though, a resilient port can “withstand an extreme natural 
event without suffering devastating losses, damage, diminished productivity or quality of life, 
without a large amount of assistance from outside the community” (Mileti 1999). For the 
purposes of this study and its focus on storm resilience, we define a resilient port more 
specifically as one that, in the face of storm events, may continue to serve its region for the 
following goals: facilitating trade as a conduit for the exchange of resources, materials, and 
finished products; facilitating business success and profit to firms; an engine for local, state, 
and/or national economic growth and stability; and a public good that minimizes environmental 
harm and contributes to residents’ quality of life. Actors may share these goals, but prioritize 
them differently, as different types of stakeholders have widely varying interests in the port.  
Since a port serves a diverse community of stakeholders and society at large, port resilience may 
also be considered as a public good from which all stakeholders may benefit. This concept 
underlies the value of considering all stakeholders’ perspectives when assessing impacts of storm 
events and strategies to build resilience. A public good is both non-excludable and non-
rivalrous, since individuals cannot be effectively excluded from its benefit, and the benefit by 
one individual does not reduce the benefit to others (Besanko and Braeutigam 2010). Egli (2012) 
shows how- on a national scale- the U.S. benefits from strengthening the Nation’s awareness and 
inter-agency coordination around the public good aspects of infrastructure resilience. Although 
little research has been conducted on this particular aspect of seaport storm resilience, in which 
the seaport is considered a public good, some insights can be obtained from similar work that 
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focused on port security, that underscore the value that planning for the long-term functioning of 
seaports can have for all stakeholders. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, much attention has been 
paid to the role of seaports play in such attacks. Haveman and Shatz (2006) suggest that the loss 
of port functionality due to these external strikes can result in a cascade of impacts on supply 
chains, port-dependent businesses and consumers who rely on the goods and materials handled 
by the port. For the same reason national defense has been identified as a public good that 
prevents these cascading impacts, seaport storm resilience may be considered a worthy goal, 
since similar outcomes can occur from the impact of a major storm hitting a port. Some of these 
impacts are quantifiable in economic terms, while others have intangible consequences on 
quality of life or the environment. Since stakeholders of a port may be expected to bear some of 
the costs associated with a hurricane strike, understanding the impacts and resilience strategies 
available, can lead to benefits for the port and the port stakeholders. 
2.4. Stakeholders	  of	  the	  port	  
Scholars and policy makers have stressed the importance of identifying stakeholders (Bryson 
2004) and including a broad range of stakeholders' perspectives in developing adaptive responses 
to climate change (Few et al. 2007) and for transport planning in particular (Ward 2001). The 
primary function of a port is the transfer of cargo and/or passengers between a waterway and the 
shore (Talley 2009), but today’s ports are more than simply a system of channels, wharves, and 
multi-modal connections. Thus, the stakeholders who depend upon the port functionality are 
diverse. Ports serve as profit centers for a variety of businesses, including shippers, shipping 
agents, energy companies, importers and exporters, and port authorities. They facilitate the 
transport of energy resources, building materials, finished products, and chemicals. Ports also 
share ecologically sensitive territory with other stakeholders, such as commercial and 
 11 
recreational users. Ports may also be considered a cultural element, embedded within and held 
accountable for the goals of a larger society (Burroughs 2005).  
Stakeholders of a port may be defined as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the organization’s objectives (Freeman 2010). As described by Notteboom 
and Winkelman (2002), the principal stakeholders of the port include the port operator (often a 
public port authority) and the firms that are directly engaged in the transfer of cargo or 
passengers. However, many stakeholders of the port share a wide variety of goals and missions 
with respect to the long-term functioning of the port, including business success, facilitating 
trade, economic growth, and public goods and services. In a sense, stakeholders of a port may 
include almost anybody (Mitchell et al. 1997), numbering in the tens or hundreds of thousands or 
more, -- if one includes all neighbors, residents depending on goods shipped through the port, 
and the customers throughout a supply chain. However, climate adaptation and building 
resilience to storm events at ports will most likely be carried out by those individuals and groups 
who will be directly affected, and who may assume responsibility for implementing and 
sustaining the adaptation measures over time (NRC 2010), thus for the purposes of this study, we 
limit the stakeholders to the port stakeholder cluster discussed in the following section. 
Though ports have been previously considered in academic research, most studies have confined 
analysis to the port authority itself or to the supply chain, of which the port is one component 
(Hall and Jacobs 2010; Goss 1990; Haezendonck 2001). However, as Hall and Jacobs (2007) 
noted, numerous other organizations must be considered within the port context. Port systems 
incorporate numerous independent firms and multi-modal transportation connections in order to 
provide services that would lead to economic growth and stability to their regions. Due to the 
complexity of port systems and the variety of ways that stakeholders depend upon port 
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functioning, a representative sampling of stakeholder concerns is necessary in order to develop a 
richer picture of the impacts beyond the concerns addressed by port operators.  
Strategic management scholars use cluster analysis to understand the “actors that can affect or 
are affected by the achievement of a firm’s objectives” (Freeman 2010). Although clusters have 
traditionally been defined as “spatially concentrated groups of firms competing in the same or 
related industries, that are linked through vertical and horizontal relationships” (Porter 1998), De 
Langen (2004) expanded this definition from “all economic activities related to the arrival of 
goods and ships,” to include “populations consisting of business units, associations, and public or 
private organizations”. Since de Langen employed the cluster concept as a lens through which 
the economic performance of the port may be viewed, the actors that make up the cluster consist 
primarily of firms. For the purposes of the present work, we expand the definition of cluster 
further to place a greater emphasis on stakeholders who have interests beyond the profit motives 
that drive the port-related firms. 
Thus, the cluster in this research loosely binds the group of organizations that have a stake in the 
long-term resilience of a port. Drawing absolute boundaries around this cluster is difficult or 
impossible, due to the global nature of the transportation network in which ports participate. 
Therefore, the port stakeholder cluster concept here includes the key stakeholders that have an 
interest in the resilience of a port and can play some role in planning or decision-making.  
The port stakeholder cluster (De Langen 2004; Haezendonck 2001) may be divided into two 
primary categories: internal and external stakeholders (Figure 3). Those stakeholders that are part 
of the port authority organization (e.g., the port operator, shareholders, managers, and 
employees) may be considered as internal stakeholders and are generally most concerned with 
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the return on investment, shareholder/stakeholder value and/or the creation of wealth. A diverse 
array of actors and organizations fall into the broader category of external stakeholders. 
Figure 3 -- Stakeholder cluster (Based on Notteboom and Winkelman, 2002) 
These external stakeholders include economic/contractual stakeholders that are involved in 
certain port operations such as stevedoring companies, shipping agencies, insurers, ship repair 
services, port tenants, and the like. These stakeholders tend to have profit-oriented missions and 
many have the agency to shift locations should a major storm strike at the port. For example, a 
shipping company can divert its cargo to a different port in the event of a disaster at its original 
destination.  
Public policy stakeholders include government agencies responsible for transport and economic 
affairs, as well as environmental agencies, planning departments, and emergency management 
agencies. These can be local (e.g., city planning and zoning commissions), state (e.g., coastal 
management programs and departments of transportation), and federal (e.g., the U.S. Coast 
Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). These 
stakeholders have responsibility for facilitating commerce, protecting the environment, and other 
aspects of public welfare. 
Community/environmental stakeholders consist of community groups, neighboring residents, the 
general (tax paying) public, environmental groups, and others. These types of groups typically 
advocate on behalf of a particular cause (e.g., water quality) or population (e.g., a residential 
neighborhood around a port). These community stakeholders may not always recognize their role 
until some event brings their dependence on the port to their attention. This may include a 
disaster at the port, plans for the development of port facilities, or a shift in the type of business 
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being conducted at the port.  
Though not explicitly included in Notteboom and Winkelmans' typology, academic research 
stakeholders can also play a role in port planning development. These may include academic 
organizations or non-governmental groups that conduct independent work or are contracted by 
another stakeholder. Particularly with regard to resilience or economic development plans, 
researchers can provide information to the port’s planning process. For example, weather 
forecasting, climate projections, and economic models may be used to inform the decision-
making process. In Providence, the University of Rhode Island’s (URI) Coastal Resources 
Center provides facilitation and communication expertise that aids in the development of 
statewide policy.  
2.5. Impacts	  of	  storm	  events	  at	  ports	  and	  assessment	  techniques	  
Identifying the specific impacts serves as a first step toward adaptation, before strategies to 
reduce (or transfer) risk and mitigate disasters can be identified, assessed, and selected (Moser 
and Ekstrom 2010; NCADAC Draft; IPCC 2007). Many databases account for disaster losses 
and numerous analyses have employed these databases to generate comparisons of risk on a 
national or International scale (Allison et al. 2009; GCRP 2009; Hanson et al. 2010). One study, 
the UNDP’s “Disaster Risk Index,” uses mortality data to create a quantitative measure that 
allows for a comparison of risk levels of various hazards between countries (Peduzzi et al. 2009). 
Another, called the “Hotspots Project,” developed a world map of hotspots that illustrates where 
the risk of mortality and economic losses due to natural hazards is greatest (Birkmann 2007). 
Depending on the database, losses are generally reported as direct monetary (observable damage 
to infrastructure) and indirect losses (e.g., decline in revenue, business interruption). Some will 
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also count these losses at the community, state, regional, or global levels, depending on the 
nature and impact of the hazard event” (Gall et al. 2009).  
Impact assessments conducted on a regional or national scale are often too general to capture the 
unique ramifications felt by a given sector, like a particular port stakeholder cluster. Thus, there 
are also many ways to categorize impacts on a local or regional scale. Short-term vs. long-term 
costs, reported vs. unreported losses, breakdowns by “who pays,” and costs by geographic area 
are but a few. The Heinz Center report, The Hidden Costs of Coastal Hazards (2000), 
recommends a combination of quantitative estimates when data are available and qualitative 
descriptions when they are not. It suggests breaking down costs by economic sectors such as: 
housing, commercial and industrial property, or transportation infrastructure. However, as the 
report points out, many of these costs are hidden and/or very difficult to quantify due to the lack 
of data. Damage assessments, typically conducted on a particular property, focus on the actual 
damages to the property, but do not account for the indirect costs and intangible consequences 
resulting from that loss that impacts the broader community.  
Impact assessment and risk identification methods typically do not allow for a detailed 
understanding of how storms might impact clusters of stakeholders who depend on a given piece 
of infrastructure, such as transportation, utilities, or seaports. Some assessments may be too 
broad in geographic scale (Lian et al. 2007; Hallegatte 2008) to inform relevant local decision 
makers, while others may focus on one projection of one particular cost, such as insured losses 
(Grossi et al. 2005) or direct damage to structures (Curtis 2007; LADOT 2006). Further, many 
traditional ways of assessing direct damages and indirect costs may only be applied post factum. 
They are designed more for looking at “what happened” and using costs for repairs and 
insurance claims to quantify damages. This case studies presented here provide the type of richer 
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understanding of the full range of potential impacts that can lead to better resilience planning for 
ports (Woodroffe 1990; IPCC 2012; Stern and Britain 2006).  
2.5.1. Challenges	  in	  seaport	  resilience	  and	  adaptation	  planning	  	  
Due to the projected impacts of climate change, planning for seaport resilience has recently 
emerged as a unique area of resilience research (McEvoy and Mullett 2013; EPA 2008; Becker 
et al. 2013), in addition to a variety of other infrastructure sectors such as roads (NRA 2012), 
airports (Baglin 2012), railways (Baker et al. 2010), and infrastructure as a general concern 
(NIAC 2009). A new body of work has begun to address a need to shift planning paradigms to 
include a range of incentives and more stakeholders in the process of creating more resilient 
ports (Ng et al. 2013; Becker et al. 2013).  
However, understanding the magnitude of port resilience issues is still in its infancy and the 
scope of the problem for ports and port stakeholders is still not well understood. Little guidance 
is available for incorporating long-term resilience (more than 20+ years out) in the port 
infrastructure planning process in the U.S. or elsewhere in the world. Further, ports also fall 
outside of the planning parameters that regulate other types of coastal uses. Ports are typically 
zoned for industrial use and thus are not subject to many regulations that are designed to protect 
the interests of residents. For example, U.S. Executive Order 11988 (Floodplain Management) 
requires federal agencies to prevent long and short-term adverse impacts associated with the 
occupancy and medication of flood plains, and to avoid direct and indirect support of floodplain 
development wherever there is a practicable alternative (FEMA 2013). However, since FEMA 
considers ports to be functionally dependent infrastructure that must be located in a floodplain, 
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requirements can often be relaxed for port infrastructure.1  
The U.S. has no centralized authority that oversees investment or operation strategies for ports 
that provides guidance or incentives for resilience planning. Further, oversight is more difficult, 
due to the port ownership structure, which may be any combination of public and private, 
ranging from those that are 100% privately owned and operated, to public/private partnerships, 
to those that are 100% publicly owned and operated. Since the port operator has a direct interest 
in the ongoing functioning of the port, one might expect to find storm resilience addressed in the 
port’s strategic planning process, which for ports is typically based on the core mission and 
principles of a port operator (Allen 2012). However, ports generally plan in accordance with 
three time horizons that do not align well with climate change projections (Dooms et al. 2004):  
Short-term planning covers a one-to-three year time span with a primary focus on operational 
issues and current practical problems.  
Medium-term planning covers three to five years and typically focuses on marketing and 
financial goals.  
Long-term planning typically covers a 10 to 25-year time horizon and focuses on the 
development of the wider port area.  
It is usually difficult for a port operator to develop concrete plans and strategies for infrastructure 
development beyond 25 years, since too many assumptions would have to be made about factors 
such as employment, cargo throughput, and technological advancements. Climate change, and 
the accompanying increase in risk from extreme events, requires a longer planning horizon. 
                                                            
1  Note that this gap is being addressed in part through the recent Presidential Policy Directive 21 – Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience that establishes a national policy to strengthen and maintain secure, 
functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure. 
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Discussions with port planners have affirmed that resilience issues are not typically a part of the 
strategic planning process (Pers. comm. Kiernan). This may be in part because of a lack of an 
appropriate incentive structure. As stated by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council, 
“Current market mechanisms may be inadequate to achieve the level of resilience needed to 
ensure public health, safety, and security. Even with a strong business case, there are low-
probability, high-consequence events for which investments in resilience by private companies 
cannot be justified” (NIAC 2009). To raise capital for expansion or improvements, ports rely on 
a combination of their own profits and public assistance on an ad hoc basis (ASCE 2012). 
However, even without factoring in climate change, a recent report projected a GDP loss of $697 
billion by 2020 unless significant investments are made into the Nation’s marine transportation 
system (ASCE 2012). Although climate change is already affecting some areas, noticeable 
changes that will impact infrastructure are not likely to become evident for several decades from 
the present (USCCSP 2008), a time horizon well outside of strategic planning processes designed 
to maximize profit. 
This section provided background on the key concepts that underlie this research. These concepts 
include climate adaptation, seaport resilience, the stakeholder cluster, and impact assessments. 
The next section provides the background and context for the case studies. It begins with an 
overview of the reasons for selecting Gulfport and Providence as case studies. It then provides 
background and context for each of the two ports. Finally, the methods used for interviews and 
the documents selection, the creation of storm scenarios as a thought prompt, as well as the 
analysis are described.  
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3. Case	  study	  description	  and	  data	  collection	  methods	  
This study considers two seaports that are highly exposed to hurricanes in which stakeholders 
have been engaged in resilience planning (Figure 4). The Port of Gulfport (MS) recently 
experienced the devastating consequences of Hurricane Katrina and has been in the process of 
rebuilding. Providence (RI) has not had a major hurricane since 1954, but is similarly exposed to 
potential storm surges in excess of 25’. The decision makers in Providence and statewide in 
Rhode Island have been involved with two principal climate adaptation efforts: a new part of the 
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program addressing adaptation to natural hazards; 
and the formation of a Climate Change Commission. We undertook the case studies of these two 
ports to focus on problem identification at the local level. Because our main interest and focus 
was on questions about impacts and resilience, we selected these ports because of their high 
exposure to hurricanes and because stakeholders were likely to be familiar with resilience 
planning. Both ports are small to medium sized and provide jobs, goods, and services to their 
local economies and communities. 
Figure 4 -- Map of Gulfport and Providence 
3.1. Overview	  of	  Gulfport	  
Gulfport, Mississippi, faced utter destruction from a 28’ storm surge during Hurricane Katrina. 
Gulfport had recently adopted a plan to elevate the entire port from 10’ to 25’ as a strategy to 
build the port’s resilience to Katrina-magnitude storms. This $140m investment in resilience was 
unparalleled. No other port that we researched had considered such a drastic step toward storm 
resilience. Thus, we selected Gulfport because we anticipated a high degree of awareness around 
the impacts of hurricanes (due to the recent Katrina event) and the potential resilience-building 
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strategies.  
The Port of Gulfport (Figure 5) is Mississippi’s largest port and the third busiest container port 
on the U.S. Gulf Coast. It imports fruit, garments, limonite ore, and hardwood lumber, and it 
exports paper, cellulose, fabrics, and other products. Primarily a container port, Gulfport handled 
216,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in 2011 (Table 1). A chief executive officer and 
five port authority commissioners oversee the port operations under the auspices of The 
Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) and the Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport 
(MSPA). The mission of the port is “to be a profitable, self-sufficient port providing world-class 
maritime terminal services to present and future customers and to facilitate the economic growth 
of Mississippi through the promotion of International trade and the creation of employment” 
(PEER 2006) 
 
Figure 5 -- Aerial view of Port of Gulfport (www.portofthefuture.com) 
Table 1 -- Port of Gulfport statistics 
Gulfport has been hit by 25 hurricanes since 1858, with 9 of them being major (i.e., Categories 3, 
4, or 5) (Figure 6). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) estimates a 
return period of 11 years for a hurricane hitting Gulfport (Blake et al. 2011). The port is very 
exposed to open water and sits in the hurricane “catcher’s mitt” of the Gulf Coast, where storms 
tend to track after passing through the Gulf of Mexico. 
Figure 6 -- Hurricane tracks near Gulfport 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 storm that brought storm 
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surges of up to 30' to Gulfport (Fritz et al. 2008). Katrina devastated much of the Gulf Coast, 
leaving almost 2000 people dead and causing $81B in damages (Knabb et al. 2005). In the City 
of Gulfport, the surge flooded six to twelve miles inland (Fritz et al. 2008). Direct damages to the 
port itself were estimated at over $50 million (Table 2). During that storm, gaming barges, a 
gantry crane, and 430,000 square feet of warehouses and freezer facilities were demolished. 
Another 400,000 square feet of enclosed warehouses, parking structures, and fill material were 
severely damaged. The public at large experienced losses due to the direct impacts of the port’s 
physical contents (containers, poultry, etc.) and also due to the indirect impacts of the port’s loss 
of business and operational continuity. The loss of business continuity resulted in rising prices, 
difficulty in obtaining materials, unemployment, and strain on other parts of the transportation 
system. The loss of operational continuity left many important resources unavailable. For 
example, the	   severe	   damage	   to	   Gulfport	   resulted	   in	   regional	   shortage	   of	   tropical	   fruits,	  because	  major	  fruit	  importers	  such	  as	  Dole,	  Chiquita,	  and	  Crowley	  were	  forced	  to	  reroute	  shipments	   to	   Port	   Everglades,	   FL,	   or	   Freeport,	   TX,	   at	   extra	   expense	   (USCCSP	   2008;	  Grenzeback	  and	  Andrew).	  The local and regional economy suffered when the operations at the 
port shut down after Katrina due to the loss of jobs, taxes, and an increase in prices. 
Table 2 -- Assessed damages to the Port of Gulfport (PEER 2006) 
3.1.1. The	  plan	  for	  restoration	  of	  The	  Port	  of	  Gulfport	  
After Katrina, the MSPA, Governor Haley Barbour, and the MDA weighed options for 
developing a more resilient port, ultimately choosing a strategy to elevate the port (see Table 3). 
However, the roots of this plan lay in a pre-existing master planning effort to expand the port in 
anticipation of new business that would come from the widening of the Panama Canal. Before 
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Katrina, the MSPA had already initiated an 84-acre port expansion program. 60 acres of the 
Mississippi Sound had been filled in before Katrina hit, leaving an additional 24 acres still to fill. 
This expansion plan was to be funded entirely through state bonds and port revenue and would 
increase business opportunities for the port. After Katrina, the Governor charged the MSPA with 
the task of developing a new strategy for resilience and the MDA with managing the funding of 
the project. The MSPA hired the JWD Group, an engineering consulting firm, to revise a 2003 
master plan that addressed new development opportunities for both maritime and non-maritime 
uses in downtown Gulfport. The new revised plan also incorporated resilience measures that 
piggybacked on a pre-existing inland port distribution-center concept; at a cost of approximately 
$130m, an inland port three miles from the coast would also serve as a freight evacuation depot 
under any significant hurricane threat. Though this evacuation plan was incorporated in the 2007 
Master Plan Update, it included no explicit discussion of future hurricane risk, or about the 
importance of storm resilience at the port itself. A detailed visioning section focuses only on 
land-use goals and port expansion (MSPA 2007). 
Table 3 -- Timeline for port resilience strategies in Gulfport 
After completing the 2007 Master Plan Update, the MSPA contracted CH2M Hill, an 
engineering consulting firm, to implement and manage the project, which began with a review 
and comment of the updated plan. CH2M Hill found that the evacuation plan was, “an enterprise 
limiting constraint, as well as an unquantifiable business risk to potential facility users. To put all 
containers at an off-site location increases the cost of shipping, thereby making the Port of 
Gulfport less attractive and less competitive to maritime carriers” (CH2M Hill 2010). CH2M Hill 
recommended a radically different approach. Rather than relying on a plan to evacuate the port 
every time a hurricane approached the Gulf Coast, they suggested elevating the entire port from 
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10' above sea level to a 25' above sea level. The Governor and MSPA agreed and the MSPA and 
MDA undertook a revision of the project’s Environmental Assessment Report to include the new 
elevation strategy. 
In their plan, they stated two main reasons for the new elevation plan: 
1. To protect facilities, equipment and cargo against storm surge; 
2. To minimize disruptions to the Port tenants by eliminating the need to fully evacuate 
the terminal in the event of an approaching storm. 
This improvement to the Port’s facilities would serve as a benefit and potential lure for new 
customers. No other port on the Gulf Coast offers such hurricane surge protection (CH2M Hill 
2010). CH2M Hill and MSPA convened a “council of experts” to assess the design feasibility of 
raising the container laydown area, while keeping the ship loading/off-loading at its current 
elevation, ultimately proposing a series of ramps between the two heights. CH2M Hill estimated 
the cost of elevating 140 acres from 10' to 15' to be approximately $140m, or $1m/acre (CH2M 
Hill 2010). Through the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the 
State of Mississippi applied for and received a “Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) 
Disaster Recovery Program” grant in the amount of $621m to “rebuild and restore the damage to 
its facilities caused by Hurricane Katrina. The allocated funds would assist in providing 
mitigation against future damage, prevent future recurrence of damage and destruction in 
Hurricane events, and provide the long-term recovery of the operating capacity of the Port” (MD 
2011). 
Once the decision to elevate the port had been made, an Environmental Assessment Report (EA), 
as required by HUD, became the main mechanism for ensuring organizational checks, balances, 
and involvement in the project. Since HUD provided the bulk of the funding, it served as the lead 
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organization for the environmental review process. However, the MDA served as the 
“responsible entity” and prepared the EA, together with the MSPA. The EA process required the 
input of numerous other agencies (Table 4). However, the EA did not require any specific 
external review of the port elevation component of the project. 
 
Table 4 – Organizations consulted in Gulfport’s Environmental Assessment for port 
restoration 
The MSPA planned to complete the “Restoration Program” project by 2017, but in 2012 decided 
to significantly downscale the elevation component of the plan in order to bring the port back 
online more quickly. As of the writing of this paper, the MSPA was weighing “no additional 
elevation” vs. “additional two-to-four foot elevation” alternatives (MSPA 2012). 
3.2. Overview	  of	  Providence	  
At the time this research was conducted, the Port of Providence, a private service port (For a 
discussion of types of ports, see PPIAF 2013), supplied a large part of Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island states with petroleum products and handled bulk and break-
bulk imports and exports. Home heating oil, jet fuel, diesel, and other petroleum products were 
imported through Providence Harbor. Numerous ancillary businesses also depended on the port’s 
functionality, including: trucking companies, rail service, manufacturing companies, ship repair 
facilities, marine pilots, and dredging companies, and even the State’s airport, which depended 
on the port for jet fuel. The Port also sat at the head of Narragansett Bay, an ecologically 
sensitive estuary that provides breeding grounds for marine life in the region. 105 acres of port 
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lands were owned by the City of Providence and operated by a five board member nonprofit 
organization, ProvPort. However, ProvPort leased the land to and contracted the services of 
Waterson Terminals LLC, to operate and maintain the port. However, the full area of the Port of 
Providence comprises a number of other waterfront businesses and industries, which together, 
took up nearly 230 acres of waterfront (Becker et al. 2010). In 2010, the Port of Providence 
handled approximately 3.1 million tons of cargo. ProvPort generated more than $200 million in 
economic benefits for the region and over 2,400 jobs were attributed to port activities (PWWA 
2010). ProvPort itself handled a variety of products, including scrap metal, wood products, coal, 
salt, cement, and chemicals. There was no official port authority in Rhode Island and the State 
played no direct role in port operations, though the state’s coastal agency does regulate land use 
in the coastal area that the port occupies.  
For the purpose of these case studies, we consider the “port” to encompass the entire port district 
(Figure 7), even though Waterson Terminal Services is referred to as the Internal Port 
Stakeholder for the purposes of this research. Since Rhode Island had no official port authority 
that oversees operations or the development of the port area in Providence, there was no 
centralized planning body that considered storm resilience issues. Even though Waterson 
Terminal Services oversaw the operation, maintenance, and planning for the terminals of 
ProvPort, they functioned more autonomously than a port authority, such as the one in 
Mississippi. 
Figure 7 -- Providence Harbor and its water dependent uses (Becker et al. 2010)	  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) considers Providence to be the “Achilles 
heel of the Northeast” due to its position at the head of Narragansett Bay (Rubinoff 2007). For 
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context, before Hurricane Katrina caused $80 billion in damages to the Gulf Coast, FEMA 
considered New Orleans to be the Achilles heel of that region. Rhode Island had been hit by nine 
hurricanes, two of them major, since 1900 (Figure 8). The length and orientation of Rhode 
Island’s Narragansett Bay, and its proximity to the Atlantic hurricane zone, make it susceptible 
to extreme storm surges from the southerly winds that are generated when a hurricane passes to 
the west of the Bay. The U.S. Geological Survey currently considers the probability of a storm 
hitting this area as “low” (Rubinoff 2007). A recent study estimates the hurricane return period 
for Rhode Island to be 24 years, with the “major” hurricane return period of 94 years based on 
historical data (USGS 2010). The Bay had not experienced a significant hurricane since 
Hurricane Carol in 1954, which produced 14.5’ of storm surge. Models for hurricane effects in 
Providence projected storm surges of over 20’, but these do not include climate change 
projections for sea level rise or the intensification of hurricanes (Blake et al. 2011). Most of the 
port lands are 3-10’ above mean high water. There is a hurricane barrier in place, but the barrier 
is north of the port and could cause higher storm-surge levels at the port, as surge waters would 
accumulate in Providence Harbor instead of spreading throughout the low-lying region now 
protected behind the barrier. 
Figure 8 -- Providence and history	  of	  storm	  tracks 
3.2.1. Adaptation	  planning	  in	  Rhode	  Island	  
As we began this research, Rhode Island was in the midst of undertaking adaptation planning 
efforts for the State. The Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), together with the 
Coastal Resources Center (CRC) at the University of Rhode Island (URI), had been drafting new 
sea level rise policies and a new Hazards Chapter for the State’s Coastal Resources Management 
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Plan. These policies provide broad guidance for adapting to new sea level rise, including 
recommendations for altering building codes. The Climate Risk Reduction Act of 2010 (RIGL 
23-84) established a new Rhode Island Climate Change Commission (RICCC 2012), with a 
mandate to study the potential impacts of climate change in the State, and identify methods to 
adapt to these changes in order to reduce harm and increase economic and ecosystem 
sustainability. The RICC would also identify ways that adaptation could be mainstreamed into 
existing state and municipal programs (e.g., policies, plans, infrastructure development). At the 
time we conducted interviews, this Commission had not yet convened. In Rhode Island, planning 
efforts such as these often involve a relatively small pool of decision makers, as Rhode Island is 
a very small state. The lead author’s experience working on such planning and policy efforts in 
the state indicated that many stakeholders of the port cluster would also have some awareness or 
involvement in these planning efforts.  
3.3. 	  Data	  collection	  and	  interview	  methods	  
The case studies were designed to identify the ways in which port stakeholders perceive the 
impacts of a hurricane occurring at the port, the ways that planning/policy addresses those 
concerns, and the potential strategies for building port resilience. 
These studies assessed two sources of information about impacts of a hurricane on the Port of 
Providence, RI and Gulfport, RI: interviews that clarified the perceptions of port stakeholders 
and policy documents that address storm issues at the port. The interviews of port stakeholders 
show the concerns of stakeholders about potential impacts that may or may not be recognized 
through the more formalized planning and policy-making process. The analysis of policy 
documents reveals how decision makers formally recognize the potential impacts of a storm 
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hitting the port. By utilizing both of these sources, a richer picture of the range of impacts and 
strategies emerged, as well as indications of disconnects between the stakeholders' concerns and 
the current policy. 
We carried out surveys in these two ports over the summers of 2010 and 2011 during two visits 
to the Port of Gulfport and three to the Port of Providence. During these visits, we conducted the 
interviews of stakeholders, collected policy and planning documents, and visited the ports 
themselves and other organizations where the interviews were conducted. 
3.3.1. Selection	  of	  interviews	  
For the purpose of this study, we consider the seaport stakeholders as a cluster that includes all 
of the organizations that could or should play some role in the decision-making regarding long-
term storm resilience for the port. We selected stakeholders using a snowball sampling approach 
(Chermack 2004; Cairns et al. 2012; Patton 2002) that resulted in an approximation of each of 
the seaport clusters. Beginning with the port managers, we asked respondents: 
What other organizations could play a role in port resilience planning, and to whom, in the 
respective organizations, should we speak to about these issues?  
As noted above, the stakeholder of the port could include every citizen in the State of Rhode 
Island or Mississippi and beyond, and number in the hundreds of thousands. We thus limited the 
cluster to those organizations that could play a role in resilience planning for the port, as 
indicated by the stakeholders themselves. When no new names or organizations were added to 
the suggested list by the interviewees and attempts had been made to interview the organizations 
mentioned, the sample was deemed complete. Named individuals were contacted, given a brief 
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explanation of the project, and subsequently interviewed. In almost all cases, the named 
individual agreed to be interviewed or designated another individual within the organization who 
did.  
In Gulfport, the 30 interviewees included five internal port stakeholders, three external 
economic/contractual stakeholders, nine federal public policy stakeholders, nine state public 
policy stakeholders, three local public policy stakeholders, and one community group 
stakeholder (Table 5). Both the MDA and MSPA were considered to be internal port 
stakeholders, rather than state agencies, because both are directly involved in the port planning 
and operations. The federal and state governments featured prominently, mostly because a state 
port authority operates the Port and the Katrina rebuilding efforts depended on federal funding. 
We were unable to interview representatives from the U.S. Customs, the State Senate, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and Kansas City Southern Railroad. Other interviewees 
mentioned these stakeholders, but we were unable to identify a specific representative who could 
speak to the issues of hurricane impacts to the port. No academic/research stakeholders were 
suggested in Gulfport.  
Table 5 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Gulfport 
In Providence, 27 interviewees	   included	   three	   internal	   port	   stakeholders,	   five	  economic/contractual	  stakeholders,	  one	  community/environmental	  group	  stakeholder,	  three	  academic/research	   group stakeholders,	   four	   federal	   public	   policy	   stakeholders,	   eight	   state	  public	  policy	  stakeholders,	  and	  three	  local	  government	  public	  policy	  stakeholders	  (Table 6).	  We	  were	  not	  able	  to	  interview	  representatives	  of	  the	  Oil	  Heat	  Institute,	  some	  of	  the	  private	  companies	  within	  the	  port	  area,	  or	  the	  Rhode	  Island	  Marine	  Pilots	  Association	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Table 6 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Providence 
3.4. Storm	  scenarios	  
In order to help interviewees think about storm events with respect to the port, we presented 
respondents with a plausible, potentially catastrophic storm scenario as a visual prompt. This 
scenario method has been successfully used in other studies on climate change to engage 
stakeholder groups and inform policy makers (Chermack 2004; Cairns et al. 2012). We created 
storm scenarios together with Applied Science Associates (Rhode Island) who developed the 
storm surge overlay for the visuals. Three students (Suejung Shin, Ernestine Fu, and Akshay 
Adya) helped develop 3D models to represent the structures of (or in) the port. The resulting 
visual scenario was a combination of a map of the port area, overlaid with a storm surge image, 
equivalent to an approximately Cat 3 (Gulfport, see Figure 9) or Cat 4 (Providence, see Figure 
10) hurricane, with an additional 1.6’ added for anticipated sea level rise. The scenario depicted a 
map of the port area overlaid with the resulting storm surge. In Providence, this represents the 
expected surge from a Category 3 hurricane that passes just west of Narragansett Bay, producing 
approximately 26’ of surge.2 In Gulfport, this represents a Category 4 storm that produces 
approximately 30’ of surge. 
	  
Figure 9 -- Port of Gulfport with simulated Category 4 storm surge 
Figure 10 -- Port of Providence with simulated Category 3 storm surge 
                                                            
2  The surge heights were derived from NOAA’s Maximum of Maximum Envelope of High Water, which is 
a worst-case scenario storm surge from a given hurricane. For more information, see 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/ssurge/ssurge_momOverview.shtml. We added 0.5m (1.6’) of sea level rise, a low-end 
projection for 2100. 
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3.5. Interviews	  with	  stakeholders	  
We conducted semi-structured interviews individually as much as possible, though in some cases 
two or three people attended an interview. In these cases, transcripts were coded to record the 
responses from each individual separately. Interviewees were assured that their identities would 
remain anonymous and that quotes from their responses would not be identified and attributed to 
them individually. We designed a questionnaire using (Moser and Ekstrom 2010) as a template 
(see Becker 2013) as it was also designed to interview stakeholders about plans and perceptions 
around climate adaptation and resilience issues. Using the storm scenario as a thought prompt, 
the purpose of the questionnaire was to elicit perceptions of storm impacts, current and potential 
strategies for reducing port vulnerability to storms, perceptions of planning processes and 
barriers to reducing vulnerability, and perceptions around climate change and climate change 
adaptation. We tested the questionnaire through six mock interviews with fellow students and 
experts in the field and revised questions that were unclear. The present study focuses on the first 
two areas of inquiry in the questionnaire (impacts of storms and resilience strategies). Questions 
probed the respondents’ perspectives on these issues, as well as on their management 
responsibilities with respect to the port. For each of the 30 questions, we also provided potential 
follow-up prompts to help generate further detailed discussion. Not all questions however, were 
covered in each interview. Interviews focused on the subjects that matched the interviewees’ 
knowledge and expertise. Thus, questions not relevant to the interviewee were skipped. 
Respondents were encouraged to think broadly about the port, the role it plays in the community, 
and the full range of hurricane impacts and strategies that could build resilience, including both 
short and long term possibilities that could be implemented by their own organization or others. 
Respondents in both case studies discussed both the strategies that were already being followed 
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and those that could be implemented in the future. If they had trouble responding to the 
questions, some follow-up prompts were used to stimulate the conversation (refer to full 
questionnaire in Becker 2013). Though it came up in interviews, we did not provide a definition 
of resilience, thus allowing the interviewees to consider this concept in a way that was most 
meaningful from their organization's perspective. In Gulfport, for instance, many respondents 
referred back to their experience with Hurricane Katrina. Although five years had elapsed since 
the storm and the interviews focused on hurricanes in general, Hurricane Katrina remained a 
strong theme. The interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed by either myself or through 
a hired transcription service. 
3.6. Document	  collection	  
In order to examine how stakeholders' perceptions were reflected in formal port planning and 
policy documents, we also examined the documents that address storm impacts and/or long-
range resilience plans for the case study ports. We identified	   planning	   documents	   for	   the	  states	   and	   cities,	   hazard	   mitigation	   plans,	   storm	   planning	   documents	   for	   individual	  businesses,	   economic	   development	   plans,	   and	   others	   that	  we	   felt	  might	   possibly	   include	  references	   to	  port	   resilience	  planning	  or	   the	   impacts	   of	   hurricanes	  on	   the	  Port.	   Through	  
web searches and suggestions received from the stakeholders during the interviews and through 
follow-up requests, we examined the 16 documents from Providence and 32 from Gulfport that 
we expected might address storm impacts and/or long-range resilience plans for the port. We 
searched the collected documents for the following keywords: “[name of the case study port]” 
and “port or seaport or ‘maritime infrastructure’” and “hurricane or storm or hazard.” We 
eliminated documents if they did not address these search terms, were not officially 
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published/released, or were not policies actually in use by a port stakeholder. 
Of the 32 documents collected and reviewed in Gulfport, 16 met the search criteria (Table 7). 
These included numerous planning documents from the Mississippi State Port Authority 
(MSPA), as the MSPA was in the process of an expansion and redevelopment process after 
Katrina. We also reviewed hurricane plans, economic impact assessments for the port, the 
testimony of Governor Haley Barbour in which he appealed for disaster recovery funding, and 
the impact assessments for the region.  
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Table 7 -- Documents reviewed from Gulfport 
Of the 16 documents collected and reviewed in Providence, six met the search criteria (Table 8). 
The Port itself had no documents that specifically addressed storm resilience, outside of a 
hurricane plan that we were not able to review formally. Interviewees, however, described this as 
a standard operating procedure for securing the port facility in advance of a storm and not a long-
term planning document. Representatives from the port informed me that planning was generally 
completed on a task basis and contracted out to consultants, thus there was no master plan or 
strategic plan for the port. The most detailed of the plans in Providence, is the Hazards Chapter 
draft that would ultimately be a part of the Coastal Resources Management Program. This plan 
also drew from a student report on debris that had been conducted at URI (Spaulding et al. 
2007). We did not include this student report in the analysis, as it was not an official 
planning/policy document. 
Table 8 -- Documents reviewed in Providence 
3.7. Coding	  method	  
Following transcription, the interviews and documents were coded and analyzed using the 
NVivo qualitative data analysis software package. The analysis used an analytic induction 
method described by Ratcliff (1994) as an iterative process that allows for themes and ideas to 
become evident through the coding process, also allowing for the modification of concepts. An 
example of this process, in this case for coding impacts of a hurricane event in Providence, is 
shown in Figure 11. The following steps summarize the coding process: 
1. Line by line review. In total, 955 pages of interview transcripts from Gulfport and 
Providence were reviewed line by line. Planning and policy documents were reviewed 
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through the use of key word searches for relevant content (e.g., storm, hurricane, impact, 
damage, port, etc.) and a review of the pages surrounding these key words. 
2. Identification of the idea to be coded (e.g., impact or strategy mentioned). A first round 
of coding was performed on transcripts and documents to identify initial impacts and 
strategies (Charmaz 2006). Key phrases and ideas were tagged, grouped, and ultimately 
distributed into broad categories and more specific subcategories. 
3. Creation of key phrase to group main ideas. A second round of coding was conducted 
with more attention to details and resulted in a variety of subcategories for both impacts 
and strategies. 
4. Creation of subcategories to group main ideas identified in Step 3. 
5. Group into main categories. 
Figure 11 -- Method of coding	  
As we developed subcategories, we continued to review the transcripts to ensure that all relevant 
ideas were captured and categorized appropriately. Coding was an iterative process and 
ultimately the documents and transcripts were reviewed numerous times. An inductive approach 
was used to create the subcategories, followed by a deductive approach to group them into three 
main impact categories described in detail below. 
3.8. Three	  impact	  types	  	  
The results of the interviews and documents were coded and bundled into the impacts categories 
defined by the IPCC. We use the IPCC’s (2012) definition of impact as an umbrella term to 
capture both the direct damage to a given port facility as well as the various indirect costs and 
intangible consequences (economic or otherwise) of that damage (Figure 12). Thus, impacts 
include three main subcategories, as follows: 
Direct damages refer to damages that occur at the time of the weather event and are a direct 
result of it, such as damage to structures, infrastructure, and property.  
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Indirect costs are the “reduction in production of goods and services, measured in terms of value 
added” (Hallegatte 2008). These include losses associated with the disaster that occur in the 
weeks, months, or years following the event. They also include losses or gains in wages, changes 
in profits, and decrease or increase in production. Models that quantify indirect costs often use 
industry input/output tables, but since they rely on regional data, the technique is difficult to 
apply to one specific facility, like the port (Cochrane 2004). 
Finally, intangible consequences include many non-market consequences of disasters. Examples 
include: loss of life, health impacts, ecosystem damages, and damages to historical and cultural 
assets. These consequences of the disaster, sometimes called high-order losses (Rose 2004) or 
hidden costs (Heinz Center 2000) are very difficult to characterize and quantify as there are often 
no economic measures available for evaluation.  
Naturally, some impacts have a cascading effect. For example, damage to a crane (direct 
damage) can result in expenses from cargo being re-routed (indirect cost) and/or that cargo being 
unavailable to consumers in the short term (intangible consequence).  
Figure 12 -- Hurricane impacts on port stakeholders 
Every attempt was made to assign each “impact mention” to a single “impact type” and category. 
This proved to be straightforward when interviewees were explicit about a given impact. In some 
instances, however, an “impact mention” fell into multiple “impact types.” For example, a 
mention of shipping containers being washed up throughout the City has a quantifiable indirect 
cost element (e.g., a fixed cost to remove a container from a residential property) and an 
unquantifiable intangible consequence impact (e.g., psychological ramifications of a resident 
living with a shipping container on their front lawn). When not explicit, we based coding on our 
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best interpretation given the context. We aimed to be as specific as possible about given impacts 
and thus allowed some impacts that might be conducive to grouping to remain distinct and 
separate. For example, a subcategory of Disruption of critical services, could have captured the 
following more specific items: Destruction of energy infrastructure, Disruption of regional 
energy distribution, Interruption of critical goods supply, Interruption of essential services, and 
Interruption of power supply. However, our intention was to allow this to be a fine-grained 
analysis, thus we kept these somewhat similar impacts distinct.  
For each impact, we also assessed whether the cost would likely fall upon the “internal 
stakeholder” (i.e., the port operator) or the “external stakeholders” (i.e., one or more of the other 
stakeholders that make up the cluster) or both. The purpose of this cost assessment was to 
examine how the range of impacts distributes across the stakeholder cluster. We assessed cost 
burdens based on the management responsibilities described by respondents in interviews, as 
well as a review of organizational mission statements, jurisdictions and mandates (Becker 2013). 
We use the concept of “bearing the cost” broadly, as some costs may be easily determined (e.g., 
the cost to repair a structure), while others may be more difficult (e.g., cost of lost business), or 
not easily quantifiable in economic terms at all (e.g., environmental costs of an oil spill). Though 
this is a subjective exercise, it offers an initial assessment of how these impacts are distributed 
across the stakeholder network. Finally, we noted which impacts were mentioned in interviews 
and which were mentioned in documents in order to examine how the impacts were addressed 
through planning and policy (for more on stakeholders interviewed and documents reviewed, see 
Becker 2013).  
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4. Results	  
The preceding section set the stage for the analysis of interviews and documents. Next we 
discuss the results for each of the three categories of stakeholders and how the costs distribute 
across the cluster. We first provide an overview of the results in aggregate and then details for 
each of the three broad impact types with examples from Gulfport and then from Providence. 
In total, we identified 106 distinct impacts through our review of all 57 interview transcripts and 
22 planning/policy documents (Figure 13). Through the analysis of 30 interview transcripts and 
16 document reviews in Gulfport, we found 253 total “mentions” of 78 distinct impacts. In the 
analysis of the 27 interviews transcripts and six documents in Providence, we found 138 total 
mentions that we grouped into 46 distinct impact types. The highest number fell into the 
“intangible consequences” category, followed by “direct damages,” and finally “indirect costs.”  
Figure 13 -- Unique impacts mentioned in Gulfport and Providence 
In each of the three sections below, a table depicts the unique impacts mentioned. For each case 
study, these tables show from which type of data source the impact was mentioned, as follows: 
Impacts mentioned in interviews only show an “I,” those found only in documents show a “D,” 
and those impacts mentioned in both documents AND interviews show a “B.” In this study, we 
do not venture too deeply into the linkages between impacts, nor the specific cost amounts that 
could arise should the event occur. However, we do also examine which stakeholders would 
likely bear those costs in order to provide a frame of reference for which groups have the most to 
lose. Cost burden for each stakeholder group, indicated by a “$” in the Table 9 and Table 10, 
shows that there is likely a monetary cost for that particular stakeholder group. In Table 11, a 
checkmark is used, as many of the costs associated with intangible consequences are difficult to 
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monetize. 
4.1. Direct	  damages	  	  
Direct damages refer to damages that occur at the time of the weather event and are a direct 
result of it, such as damage to structures, infrastructure, and property. These are shown in detail 
in Table 9. 
Table 9 -- Table of direct damages 
4.1.1. 	  Gulfport	  direct	  damages	  
The interviews and documents from Gulfport combined contained 128 total mentions of 30 
unique direct damages. These include many damages experienced at the port itself, as well as 
damages to the surrounding area that result from events at the port. Though interviewees were 
provided with the future storm scenario, they tended to refer back to their experience with 
Katrina. Thus, most of the direct damages mentioned were descriptions of actual events, rather 
than perceptions about what could happen during the next event. Many direct damages also 
result in downstream indirect costs and intangible consequences, which will be addressed in 
subsequent sections, as tracing those pathways in detail was beyond the scope of this study.  
In interviews, many respondents focused on Damage caused by debris off port property, which 
refers to the containers and cargo that were washed off port property during Katrina. Twelve of 
the interviewees talked about these issues in terms of the direct damage associated with debris. 
Some aspects of this debris problem are easily quantified in monetary terms, such as the cost of 
cleanup or the damage to a building caused by a piece of debris. However, as subsequent 
sections will show, the impacts of debris are cross cutting and also include indirect costs, and 
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intangible consequences. Some debris damaged the port itself, but much of it originated from the 
port and resulted in other types of impacts throughout the city. Interviewees described how, 
during Katrina, the storm surge completely submerged the port, containers floated freely, 
industrial rolls of paper ended up on the second story of the parking garage, warehouse contents 
were scattered throughout the surrounding neighborhoods, and the structures on the port itself 
suffered enormous damages due in part to debris. Shipping containers in particular caused 
extensive damage. One respondent described containers surfing down the faces of waves, and 
“flying into neighborhoods, breaking up houses that may have been repairable from flooding 
alone, but instead were just pulverized.” 
Nine respondents, most from the port or port businesses, also recounted a variety of direct 
damages to port property itself, including gantry cranes, warehouses, piers, and utility lines that 
Katrina completely destroyed: 
[The port] was flattened. There was nothing here. Our berth collapsed . . . Eight 
weeks later, the channel was okayed [and] later they finally brought a ship in, but 
it was of course restricted to daylight only ... The infrastructure was completely 
gone.  
Direct damages to freight and cargo referred to cargo and freight, but interviewees spoke about 
it more as a cause of damage (as debris) than as a loss in and of itself. In the context of the level 
of damage and costs of cleanup, the monetary loss associated with a cargo of poultry products or 
some industrial rolls of paper was probably quite minor and likely covered by insurance. Like all 
ports, Gulfport depends on a transportation network that includes road and rail. Though two of 
the documents reviewed mentioned general damage to the on-port rail lines, interviewees did not 
discuss damages to road and rail specifically. However, we were not able to speak with a 
representative from the Kansas Southern Rail Company.  
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The planning and policy documents we analyzed focused on direct damages at the port in great 
detail. A damage assessment undertaken by the Mississippi State Port Authority (MSPA) 
consisted of an extensive survey of the port property conducted after Katrina, that assessed the 
level of damage to all buildings, piers, wharves, and equipment at the port (MSPA 2005). The 
repair and rebuild estimates from this assessment were used both for insurance claim purposes 
and as a work list for the MSPA. The report notes 22 unique damages to the eastern and western 
piers. Items included debris fields under the piers, building foundation damages, building topside 
damages, total destruction of buildings, damage to railways, and damage to utilities.  
The costs of repairs for direct damages fall primarily upon the internal port stakeholders, though 
many such costs will also be paid by the economic/contractual stakeholders who conduct direct 
business with the port. Port tenants, for example, could bear the costs of repairs to their buildings 
and equipment, utilities (e.g., the cost to replace electric service to refrigerated storage 
containers), or damage resulting from flooding. Many of these direct damage costs result from 
repairs and cleanup. In the case of Katrina, the port tenants and insurance companies paid for 
some of the damages mentioned, though interviewees did not discuss specifics. In addition, the 
Federal Government provided funding for both repair and rebuilding/expansion of the port 
through both FEMA ($60 million) and Community Development Block Grant funds 
(approximately $560 million). Numerous indirect costs and intangible consequences, however, 
also result from these direct damages. Those are discussed in the following sections. 
4.1.2. Providence	  direct	  damages	  	  
In Providence, a total of 15 distinct direct damages were mentioned cumulatively in interviews 
and in the planning and policy documents. Twelve of these were mentioned in interviews, but 
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only three were mentioned in the planning and policy documents. 
Most of the impacts mentioned in Providence referred to potential damages to port property, 
either to structures or equipment or to the wharves and berths at the port. The petroleum fuel 
tanks located in the port area stood out as a major concern amongst those interviewed. Concerns 
about the tanks included damage to the tanks themselves, spills, and even the possibility that 
with enough storm surge, the tanks might float off their bases. These damages to tanks could 
have major repercussions for the region, as they could also result in both indirect costs (e.g., 
cleanup costs) and intangible consequences (e.g., environmental harm from fuel spillage). One 
respondent illustrated his concern by telling an anecdote about the last major storm some 55 
years before:  
We’ve got big time problems down in the port as far as hazards are concerned. In 
1954 we had hurricane Carol come through here … petroleum tanks went floating 
down Narragansett Bay because the storm surge that came up flooded out the low 
lying areas of the port.  
Almost all of these direct damages would likely result in some or all of the costs being borne by 
the port itself, though others, such as damage to vessels and barges would likely be covered by 
external stakeholders, mainly grouped in two categories: the economic/contractual stakeholders 
who are tenants at the port and the stakeholders who do business directly with the port (e.g., 
insurance companies, shipping companies, rail lines). Many such damages would likely be 
covered through insurance policies, unless the damage far exceeded the amount covered, 
however we were not able to review the specific insurance policies to ascertain which specific 
damage items would be covered. The Federal Government, through disaster relief funds would 
also likely cover some cleanup and rebuilding costs. Other stakeholder in the cluster, such as the 
local public policy makers and the community groups, would probably not be responsible for the 
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costs associated with direct damages. Although most costs associated with direct damages would 
fall primarily upon the internal port stakeholders, many indirect costs and intangible 
consequence costs that result from these direct damages would be shouldered by external 
stakeholders, as shown in the subsequent sections. 
4.2. Indirect	  costs	  	  
Indirect costs are the “reduction in production of goods and services, measured in terms of value 
added” (Hallegatte 2008). These impacts could be quantified in economic terms, although special 
models or techniques would be required to do so. Table 10 details these unique impacts. 
Table 10 -- Table of indirect costs 
4.2.1. Gulfport	  indirect	  costs	  
Interviewees and documents in Gulfport mentioned 18 distinct impacts (for a total of 49 total 
mentions) that we classified as “indirect costs.”  
Lost business for ports and port tenants was mentioned 15 times in the documents reviewed and 
7 times in interviews. The interviews mentioned that many businesses in Gulfport suffered or 
even failed due to Katrina and that five years after Katrina, the Port of Gulfport still operated at 
about 80% of its pre-Katrina business. Two major clients had shut down their operations at the 
port and at least one was still operating, out of a temporary facility on the grounds of the port. 
After Katrina, ports that were less damaged and less vulnerable were appealing to shippers that 
had been long established in Gulfport. As one official put it:  
You can rest assured these other ports were running around trying to get our 
business. They knew we were suffering; and I can promise you they were knocking 
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on each one of these guys’ doors down here trying to get them to come to their 
ports. It’s just the nature of the business.  
Delays in port-related commerce and increased prices were discussed by several interviewees, 
but were mentioned only twice in the port’s planning and operations documents. Business 
interruptions occur in many sectors after a storm, but the port firms play an especially important 
role in the process of rebuilding communities: Since rebuilding and restoring a sense of normalcy 
depend heavily on the movement of materials, the lost business in and around the port can result 
in shortages of necessary supplies.  
In reviewing the port planning and operations documents, we found no calculations and little 
explicit quantification of these indirect impacts even when the impact itself was mentioned. One 
exception was in the Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) report which cited a loss of 
“about 1,200 port-related jobs (direct, indirect, and induced)” over the two years following 
Hurricane Katrina (MDA 2011). We were not able to ascertain the methodology used to develop 
these job-loss numbers. MDA also reported port revenue falling significantly from about 
$20m/year in the years preceding Katrina (combined maritime and non-maritime) to about 
$9m/year in the two years following. These indirect costs fall upon the internal port stakeholders 
and many others within the stakeholder cluster. Indeed, determining who exactly will pay for 
these is difficult to ascertain. Interviewees also mentioned one positive-spillover effect: 
rebuilding can stimulate the economy.  
Impacts such as lost business for port and port tenants can affect all stakeholders of the cluster: 
e.g., internal stakeholders lose lease revenues, economic/contractual stakeholders lose profit, the 
public loses the services provided by the individual businesses and potential jobs that are 
associated with those businesses. Delays in port-related commerce and increased profits affect 
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stakeholders in a similar way. Either the state or the economic/contractual stakeholders, along 
with the port operator, would often pay many of the costs associated with cleanup. The one 
positive-spillover impact noted by interviewees could benefit a number of stakeholders. Since 
cleanup and rebuilding stimulates the economy, the port, the economic/contractual stakeholders, 
and the public sector all stand to gain in some ways from a disaster, as well. For example, new 
jobs can be created in the construction sector and federal funding (e.g., FEMA and HUD grants) 
can benefit local workers and businesses.  
4.2.2. Providence	  indirect	  costs	  
In Providence, we identified seven distinct types of indirect costs, including one positive 
spillover. All seven were mentioned in interviews, but only one General business continuity 
problems was mentioned in the documents we reviewed. Other indirect costs included cleanup, 
emergency response, and emergency services costs associated with cleanup and re-opening the 
navigation channel, as well as costs associated with delays in port-related commerce, such as 
business losses that would result from port businesses being shut down after the storm.  
Unlike the direct damages, which would most likely be paid by the internal port stakeholders, 
external stakeholders would likely pay for many of the indirect costs. The result of a shutdown of 
the port or an important navigational channel for example (e.g., cleanup costs or costs to survey 
the channel), might be paid for through tax revenues or business losses experienced by port 
tenants and other external contractors. Cleanup and emergency service costs would likely be 
covered by the public agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
the Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency (RIEMA), or the City of Providence. The 
State would also need to hire emergency relief workers, a cost not currently included in its 
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budget, according to one state representative.  
4.3. Intangible	  Consequences	  
 Intangible consequences is the broadest category. It captures a wide range of impacts, many of 
which occur in the months and years following the event itself. Many of these are many non-
market consequences, which are very difficult to monetize, as there are often no economic 
measures available for evaluation. Table 11 shows the intangible consequences found in the two 
case studies. 
Table 11 -- Table of intangible consequences 
4.3.1. Gulfport	  intangible	  consequences	  
In Gulfport, we found 46 unique intangible consequences in interviews and documents 
combined. Many of the stakeholders focused on the many consequences of the debris resulting 
from Hurricane Katrina, including: the stench, the health hazards, and the difficulty of cleanup. 
For weeks after the storm, neither the MSPA, nor the tenants or the City addressed this problem.  
This debris resulted in many secondary impacts that were very difficult to monetize, yet were 
significant to the community. One interviewee, for example, indicated that salmonella from the 
rotting carcasses had made its way into the soil on homeowner’s properties. In addition to the 
items that washed up on private property, debris ended up in the waterway, causing both 
environmental and navigation issues. As stated in one interview: The water comes up, it moves 
into the coastal areas, and then when it’s retreating back to the ocean it’s pulling [all kinds of 
materials back], so going back [later] to do dredging work, you’ve got these [residual] issues 
from debris. 
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Debris is especially problematic because of the difficulty in assigning responsibility for damages 
and cleanup. For example, if a shipping container floats free and causes a breach in a petroleum 
tank, which organization bears responsibility? The owner or insurer of the container? The 
longshoreman who secured the containers? The owner of the petroleum tank? According to the 
interviewees, the organizations in Gulfport litigated for years over these kinds of issues. After 
Katrina, there were more than 50 claims of this nature. As one respondent described it: People 
[were] real pissed off about chickens being in their yard. It was crazy to blame and sue the port 
because they weren’t even their chickens; they belonged to the shipping company.  
Interviewees described many other impacts that would be very difficult to quantify in economic 
terms. In the aftermath of Katrina, the costs of insurance policies rose, certain risks became 
uninsurable, and moratoriums were placed on new policies. Though aspects of these impacts 
may be quantifiable, many are not. For example, it is difficult to say how the inability to insure 
against future risk affects a business: Would the business operate anyway if authorized by its 
financial backers? Would it change its operations in some way? Would it move its operations? 
As one Gulfport respondent said, [Without insurance], the whole economy was going to come to 
a frigging halt. Because if you can’t insure it you can’t finance it, if you can’t finance it you 
can’t build it.  
Another intangible consequence results from the loss of use of the port due to damage. An 
undamaged port can be an important resource for disaster recovery and response (Mileski and 
Honeycutt 2013). It can serve as a staging ground for supplies, manpower, and equipment. While 
not always defined as a “critical facility”, like a hospital or fire station, a port can be instrumental 
in cleanup, recovery, and rebuilding. With roads and bridges closed, ports offer an alternative for 
bringing in goods and relief workers. However, a port that is severely damaged will not be 
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available to provide these services, as was the case in Gulfport after Katrina. One respondent 
described how even after the channel was cleared, the port was not able to support disaster relief 
ships because it had no water or sewer infrastructure.  
After Katrina, a lack of available staff further hindered recovery resulting in another intangible 
consequence: When people are trying to figure out their livelihoods and where they’re going to 
live and everything, it’s kind of hard to have them working for you. These types of labor and 
employment consequences impacted many individuals and businesses in the region. Some of the 
port’s employees had no homes and prioritized finding a place for their families to live over 
returning to work. Port officials also discussed how storms like Katrina could create additional 
difficulties in port planning and development. Plans for growing the Port of Gulfport that had 
taken years to develop had to be shelved and priorities reviewed after Katrina destroyed the port, 
setting the port’s expansion timeline back by a considerable amount of time.  
Respondents also talked about many issues that we categorized as general disruptions to a sense 
of normalcy and the quality of life. Some of these, like disruptions of energy supply, can be 
traced back to port uses (e.g., a damaged fuel terminal results in interruptions of fuel supply). 
Interviewees indicated that normal life was disrupted for months or even years after Katrina as 
residents worked to clean up and rebuild their homes and places of employment. Many 
respondents also talked about environmental consequences such as household chemicals and 
other materials that would end up in the waterway and marine sediment layer. Chemical 
contamination harms marine life and results in higher costs for dredging, as special techniques 
must be used to minimize contamination of the waterway and to dispose of toxic dredge spoils. 
In this way, even waterway contamination that occurred from an off-port location would still 
have an impact on port operations and costs since dredging is a requirement for ongoing 
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operation of the port. As one respondent noted:  
Ensuring that the sediments are suitable for ocean disposal, upland disposal, or 
open water disposal becomes very costly as you may have [tested the sediment 
and] initially started to dredge, [but then] if you have a storm you may have to go 
right back and test it again, which could cost another $300,000 to $400,000.  
Consequence for the local and regional economy from losing port functionality included a 
variety of public sector concerns, as well as reductions in energy product imports and damages to 
other infrastructure commonly found at or near the port. For example, respondents talked about 
their experience trying to rebuild in a crippled local economy: 
Immediately after Katrina, the infrastructure was not in place anymore to house 
and feed workers and handle all the rebuilding … materials were scarce, because 
everybody was fighting for a limited amount of building materials and products. 
Salaries went way up because there was a limited work force … everybody was in 
a bidding war for labor.  
Public sector impacts such as fuel availability for generators and transportation, lack of boat 
access to the navigational channel, and the costs of unemployment, all slowed down the recovery 
process. Some aspects of these intangible consequences may be quantifiable. For example, lost 
jobs in the labor and employment consequences subcategory may manifest as unemployment 
insurance costs. Pollution to bay or waterway may also be quantified using specialized 
techniques such as those used to value ecosystem services (Daily et al. 2009).  
Generally speaking, the costs of intangible consequences that were identified through interviews 
and documents were distributed across the stakeholder cluster. The internal port stakeholders feel 
the effect of most of these, but most also can be felt in the budgets of public agencies and in, for 
example, the quality of life of community members in the local region and the state.  
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4.3.2. Providence	  intangible	  consequences	  
The 24 intangible consequences found in Providence ranged from job losses, to disruptions in 
energy and critical service supplies, to a whole host of potential environmental damages 
resulting from spills originating at the port. Some aspects of these impacts may be quantifiable in 
monetary terms (e.g., port facility closures do have a financial component, as well as other non-
financial components), but many would be extremely difficult or even impossible to quantify in 
financial terms. For example, the environmental damages resulting from coal, cement, or other 
materials spilling into the waterway could have far-reaching implications for the whole 
ecosystem of the Narragansett Bay. One respondent described these consequences, as follows: 
You have liquid petroleum products, cement, [and] a chemical company all of 
which are going to be submerged [and] subject to debris damage ... They’re all 
going to be pulled right back into the Narragansett Bay, you’re going to have a 
lot of potential impacts to a lot of important resources that are really hard to 
[comprehend]. 
Another respondent mentioned the intangible consequence of losing the port as a resource in 
disaster recovery and response scenarios, since ports can serve as staging areas for response 
efforts that aid in recovery. As discussed in the Gulfport section above, a severely damaged port 
could result in a longer and more difficult recovery process period, affecting the region as a 
whole (Spaulding et al. 2007; Mileski and Honeycutt 2013).  
Six respondents also discussed impacts that fell into the broad category of general disruptions to 
a sense of normalcy and the quality of life. Since the port provides essential services to the 
region, losing port functionality results in disruptions of energy supplies and other materials that 
can negatively impact overall quality of life (e.g., residents have no fuel for heating or driving) 
and result in psychological stress (e.g., the shear scale of the disaster is overwhelming and leaves 
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residents with a feeling of hopelessness). A very real example of this occurred after Hurricane 
Sandy in New York/New Jersey when the damaged port infrastructure prevented necessary 
petroleum products from getting to the New Jersey refineries. Queues at the gas pumps stretched 
for miles and hours. 
Debris was also cited numerous times, with some respondents describing debris that originated at 
the port and impacted other parts of the Bay. Other respondents discussed the impact that debris 
from elsewhere could have on port operations (e.g., debris could shut down the navigation 
channel as discussed in the Indirect Costs section above). The numerous mentions of debris were 
likely due in large part to a detailed study conducted by students at the University of Rhode 
Island (Spaulding et al. 2007). Five of the respondents indicated that they had read this study. 
We did not include the student report itself in our review of official planning and policy 
documents, since it did not qualify as an official planning or policy document of any of the 
stakeholders within the cluster. However, the “Hazards Chapter” of the Metro Bay Region 
Special Area Management Plan referenced many of the specific debris concerns brought to light 
in the student's report. In fact, of the 12 impacts we found mentioned in the Hazards Chapter, 
eight referred specifically to debris.  
All of the stakeholders in the port cluster would share to some extent in the costs associated with 
these intangible impacts, though most of the costs burden would fall primarily upon external 
stakeholders. For example, damage at the port prevents more efficient disaster response for 
region, results from not having the port available as a resource for recovery: A functioning port 
could serve as a landing area for barges that collect debris; U.S. Coast Guard vessels performing 
survey work; a terminal for necessary fuel products,; among many other necessary functions. A 
damaged port also could result in individual tenants within the port losing their insurance 
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coverage, thus the service that those businesses supply (e.g., fuel supply, building materials, 
scrap metal or debris export) would also be unavailable as resources to the overall cleanup effort.  
The environmental damages, such as chemical spills or bulk materials washing into the 
waterway, also result in costs that are difficult to quantify in monetary terms, but will ultimately 
be borne by society as a whole. For example, pollution could make the bay unsuitable for 
swimming or fishing and harm the sensitive marine environment that provides breeding areas for 
many species that make up the marine ecosystem. The quality of life of residents in the City and 
State could be affected by this type of pollution or other impacts, due to lost jobs, lack of access 
to gasoline or heating oil, or simply due to the psychological effects resulting from a disaster that 
destroys the port. 
5. Discussion	  
The preceding sections described the results from interviews and documents in both Gulfport and 
Providence. Findings from each of the three broad categories of impacts were discussed, with 
examples provided from each of the two case study locations. These results provide empirical 
evidence for the vast range of impacts that can occur when a major hurricane hits a port, as well 
as an assessment of which stakeholder groups would likely bear the costs (financial or otherwise) 
for these different types of impacts. The next sections put these results into context. In Section 
5.1, the three original research questions are discussed, with detail from each of the two case 
studies locations provided in turn. We then provide some comparative analysis between these 
two case studies in Section 5.2, with a focus on the similarities and differences and where results 
might be more generalizable to other ports. In Section 5.3, we discuss some of the planning and 
policy implications from these findings, with a particular focus on leadership issues, the use of 
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qualitative assessments for policy, and some of the unique challenges of seaport resilience 
planning. Finally, we address the limitations and next steps for this work. 
5.1. Summary	  of	  research	  questions	  findings	  
In this section, we address the three research questions posed at the beginning of this paper for 
each of the two case studies. 
5.1.1. QUESTION	  1:	  How	  do	  port	  stakeholders	  in	  Gulfport	  (MS)	  and	  Providence	  (RI)	  perceive	  
the	  impacts	  of	  a	  major	  hurricane	  hitting	  the	  port	  
 
This question was designed to ascertain how different stakeholders think about a major hurricane 
hitting the port. We did not set out to assess level of concern or priorities, rather we wanted to 
provide a catalogue of impacts that could be further tested and assessed in future work. We also 
analyzed how the different groups of stakeholders considered the impact types by averaging the 
total number of impacts mentioned by respondents from each group. These results are depicted 
in the radar plots in Figure 14 and Figure 15. We first discuss perceptions of stakeholders in 
Gulfport and then Providence. 
Perceptions of Stakeholders in Gulfport 
Stakeholders interviewed from the Port of Gulfport consisted primarily of public agencies at 
local, state, and federal levels (16 total), but also included economic/contractual firms in and 
around the port itself (3). There were five port officials interviewed and one community group. 
In sum, stakeholders mentioned more unique intangible consequences (28 total) than direct 
damages (16 total) or indirect costs (13 total) Figure 14 shows the average number of impacts 
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mentioned by interviewees from each of these five major parts of the port stakeholder cluster. 
For example, on average internal port stakeholders (of which five were interviewed) mentioned 
4.5 direct damages, 2.6 indirect impacts, and 3 intangible consequences each. This suggests that 
these stakeholders, as a group, were fairly well balanced in how they considered the impacts 
across the three broad categories. The other stakeholder groups all skewed toward more mentions 
of intangible consequences, as opposed to direct damages or indirect costs. In interviews, port 
officials showed a deep understanding of the variety of impacts, as well as the ripple effects that 
these impacts can have. In fact, they had been dealing with the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
for several years and working toward building a more storm resilient port. They discussed many 
of the direct damages from Katrina, as well as the impacts on the economy and the surrounding 
community. As we will see in Section 5.1.3, many of these concerns were not reflected explicitly 
in the port’s plans and policies, but the representatives themselves had a very high level of 
awareness around the various impacts of a storm like Katrina or the one depicted in the scenario 
we provided. 
Figure 14 -- Impacts by stakeholder group (Gulfport) 
As an aside, climate change will increase the probability of storms like Katrina in the coming 
decades (Grinsted et al. 2013). Though we did not set out to interview stakeholders about climate 
change specifically, many of them discussed climate change as they were answering questions 
about how they perceive the impacts of potential storms. Respondents were fairly evenly split 
between those who were and were not concerned about climate change impacts. One concerned 
respondent stated: 
[We] lack a look at sea level rise in the region. Not just for the Port of Gulfport, 
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but for Harrison County. What is sea level rise going to do to the total 
infrastructure of Harrison County? Well it’s going to totally destroy it…Raising 
the port to 25’ elevation is stupid, because the surrounding land is not at 25’, and 
they’re not going to raise all of Harrison County. So yeah, your containers will sit 
there, but everything in them is going to rot because you’re not going to be able 
to get them off the port … The way the area’s developed, you’d have to totally 
destroy downtown Gulfport [in order to make the port] truly resistant to sea level 
rise. 
As one unconcerned respondent put it, I hadn’t really thought about it; I mean I’d thought about 
global warming and how it raises the water, [but I thought] it was insignificant. The contractor 
told us that it didn’t really matter. Others were under the impression that sea level rise had 
already been taken into account in the elevation plan: Flooding . . . is one of our concerns … I’m 
pretty sure [the port considered] sea level rise. The new floodplain maps drafted by FEMA do 
not, however, incorporate any climate change projections (FEMA 2009). 
Perceptions of Stakeholders in Providence 
The Providence stakeholder cluster interviewed consisted of three internal port representatives, 
16 from the public policy sector, seven from economic/contractual firms, three from academia, 
and one from a community/environmental group. Interviews mentioned 14 unique direct 
damages, seven indirect damages, and 15 intangible consequences. As above, we assessed how 
different stakeholder groups considered impacts of our storm scenario by simply averaging the 
number of unique impacts mentioned for interviewees in each stakeholder group. Figure 15 
shows a radar plat with these results and suggests that different types of stakeholder think about 
impacts in different ways. The port representatives focused more on the direct damages and 
indirect costs, with no mentions at all of the intangible consequences of the event. Both public 
agencies and academics tended to talk about the intangibles more and the economic/contractual 
stakeholders talked about all three types. Though the sample size was small, these findings do 
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suggest that gaps may exist in how different stakeholders consider these types of storm impacts. 
Figure 15 -- Impacts by stakeholder group (Providence) 
5.1.2. QUESTION	  2:	  How	  will	  internal	  and	  external	  stakeholders	  bear	  the	  costs	  resulting	  from	  
a	  hurricane	  hitting	  the	  port?	  
 
This question was designed to explore how the costs of the impacts identified might distribute 
amongst different stakeholders. Port stakeholders of Gulfport (MS) and Providence (RI) 
identified a wide range of direct damages, indirect costs, and intangible consequences of a 
hurricane hitting the port and these would result in costs that would be borne by all port 
stakeholders as well as society as a whole, as depicted in the tables in Section 4. For each of the 
impacts noted, we assigned the cost (economic or non) to one or more stakeholders, based on our 
own intuition as informed through interviews and a review of organizational missions and 
mandates. Overall, we found that these costs were well distributed throughout the stakeholder 
clusters, with the port bearing the most responsibility for direct damages. The indirect costs and 
costs associated with intangible consequences will likely fall more heavily upon the external 
stakeholders, as seen in rather than on the internal stakeholders of the port. All stakeholders will 
bear the costs to some extent, with the potential impacts affecting the environment, quality of 
life, jobs, emergency recovery, and much more. Next we look at costs for each of the case 
studies independently. 
Costs in Gulfport 
Figure 16 shows what percentage of the distinct identified costs fall upon each of four 
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stakeholder groups.3 The internal port (i.e., the Mississippi State Port Authority at Gulfport) and 
the economic/contractual stakeholders (e.g., the shippers, insurance companies, and port tenants) 
would likely bear a large percentage of the direct damages (93% and 83% respectively) and the 
indirect costs (94% and 83% respectively). Eighty percent of intangible costs would be borne by 
the public policy (and by implication, taxpayers) and community/environmental groups. Though 
this analysis does not indicate the magnitude of costs, it does suggest that the external 
stakeholder groups will likely be most affected by the indirect costs and intangible consequences 
resulting from a hurricane hitting the port.  
Figure 16 -- Costs upon stakeholders (Gulfport) 
Costs in Providence 
In Providence, the costs distributed similarly to Gulfport: the internal port and 
economic/contractual stakeholders would bear the highest percentage of the direct damage and 
indirect costs, while the public policy and community/stakeholder groups would bear the highest 
percentage of the intangible costs (Figure 17). However, differentiating between the external and 
internal stakeholders is fuzzier in the case of Providence, in particular when assessing the costs 
of the various impacts identified. Unlike Gulfport, where the port is contained in one very 
specific location and operated by the MSPA, the Port of Providence covers a large geographic 
area and includes numerous independent firms. There is no overarching port authority with 
responsibility for the entire district. For the purposes of this analysis, we assigned costs to the 
Port (i.e., Waterson Terminal Services) only if the Port itself would directly pay for the repair or 
recovery cost. 
                                                            
3 In this portion of the analysis, the “academic/research” stakeholders are excluded, as these stakeholders would not 
likely bear any unique to them as a stakeholder group. 
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Figure 17 -- Costs upon stakeholders (Providence) 
No impact assessments had been conducted in either Providence or Gulfport with a goal to 
identify the full range of impacts at a scale that is wide enough to capture concerns of multiple 
stakeholders of the port, yet narrow enough to trace the root of the impact back to one particular 
facility. Results from these case studies suggest that much of the burden for these external costs, 
as well as those internal costs that exceed the port’s insurance coverage will ultimately be borne 
by the public in the form of disaster relief, cleanup and rebuilding costs, and negative impacts on 
the environment and quality of life. These case studies identified an area for future research into 
disconnects between current port resilience planning practices, impacts assessments, and 
understanding the costs of storm impacts at ports that are ultimately borne by the public.  
5.1.3. QUESTION	  3:	  In	  what	  ways	  are	  port	  stakeholders	  considering	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  port	  
in	  planning	  and	  policy?	  
In this section, we compare the impacts that were identified in existing planning and policy 
documents with those concerns expressed in interviews. To appropriately plan for port resilience, 
the full range of impacts and cost burdens must be understood and accounted for through port 
planning, local/state planning, or both. These impacts may be identified through vulnerability 
assessments (Bierbaum et al. 2013; Preston et al. 2010) or incorporated into other more general 
plans. Through the review of documents for these two case studies, we found that Gulfport had 
16 planning/policy documents that assessed Hurricane Katrina damages in the region and at the 
port, but we found no study that could be considered a “vulnerability assessment” that addressed 
the port specifically. Providence had six planning/policy documents that addressed both the port 
and storms and two that could be considered vulnerability assessments, though not vulnerability 
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assessments of the port specifically. In both cases, far more impacts were discussed in interviews 
than in documents and intangible consequences figured prominently in the minds of 
interviewees. We next examine findings from each of the two case studies. 
Gulfport’s documents vs. interviews 
Interviews and document comparison shows the differences between how stakeholders perceive 
impacts of the storm and how the port’s planning documents address them. Figure 18 shows the 
number of mentions for each of the three categories of impacts in interviews only, documents 
only, and both interviews and documents. Overall, the specific impacts of past or future 
hurricanes at the port received little attention in the documents. The port’s own planning and 
policy documents from Gulfport focus primarily on direct damages, with very few mentions of 
intangible consequences. Most of the specific impacts that were noted in these documents, 
originated from just one source: the damage assessment conducted by the MSPA after Katrina. 
This report went into great detail on the individual direct damages to port property.  
Very few indirect costs were cited in the documents, but those that were, included tonnage 
declines, employment losses, and lost tenants. Missing from the documents was analysis of the 
role the port plays in the wider region and the many ways that damage to port infrastructure 
ripples out to affect the port cluster as a whole. Interviewees, on the other hand, were far more 
concerned with the intangible consequences. This suggests that stakeholders of the port cluster 
had many concerns about hurricanes at the port that had not been formally addressed through 
planning and policy resulting in found a gap between stakeholder concerns and resilience 
planning for the port 
Figure 18 -- Impacts mentioned in interviews vs. documents (Gulfport) 
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Of the documents analyzed and coded from Gulfport, ten were drafted by the MSPA and 
addressed plans to restore and expand the port after Katrina. This project was funded through 
The Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) through a $621m grant 
from the Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Program to rebuild and repair 
the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina (Becker 2013). The allocated funds were to “provide 
mitigation against future damage, prevent future recurrence of damage and destruction in 
Hurricane events, and provide the long-term recovery of the operating capacity of the Port 
(MSPA 2010),” though no specific requirements were attached to the funding. Then-Governor 
Haley Barber also prioritized a port that would be more storm resistant. In the plan, the 
improvements would potentially attract new customers, as no other port on the Gulf Coast offers 
such hurricane protection. 
Public comment and review for the elevation project reflected that the broader stakeholder 
cluster did not bring these concerns to the attention of the port. Most of the public comments 
addressed job creation, instead of the hurricane protection strategies the port planned to 
incorporate. For its part, the MSPA’s main mission is to be “a profitable, self-sufficient port 
providing world-class maritime terminal services to present and future customers and to facilitate 
the economic growth of Mississippi through the promotion of international trade and creation of 
employment” (CH2M Hill 2010). There is no explicit mandate for the port to consider the 
interests of other stakeholders in the cluster or the long-term viability of the port, though many 
interests and goals are common to both groups. In addition, the funding the port received for the 
project had no specific requirements for hurricane resilience; rather, the HUD mandate was tied 
to job creation. By the time our research was completed, the port commissioners had voted to 
abandon the elevation plan entirely in favor of investment in a channel-deepening project. As 
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stated by one of the port commissioners in a newspaper article, "I need to move forward. We 
need to get jobs. We need to get moving out and get this behind us” (MSPG 2012). A logical 
next step would be surveying the stakeholders themselves to better quantify their perceptions of 
the importance of the various impacts noted by the cluster as a whole.  
Providence’s documents vs. interviews 
Given the far-reaching impacts across the stakeholder cluster, one might expect to find port 
resilience against hurricanes referenced in many of the Providence documents we reviewed. 
However, most of the stakeholders in the cluster had no planning or policy documents that 
specifically addressed port resilience and those that did address it, did so in a cursory manner. 
Sixteen impacts total were mentioned in the six documents, fewer than half the number discussed 
in interviews (Figure 19). About half of the impacts identified in these documents came from just 
one plan: the “Hazards Chapter” (CRMC 2011) of the Metro Bay Special Area Management 
Plan (SAMP). It mentions seven specific impacts, with eight references to debris. It also 
mentions three of the direct damages that could occur at the port itself and it includes the port in 
its list of critical facilities. Other plans, however, did not include the port as a critical facility. In 
the Hazard Mitigation Plans, for example, critical facilities were specifically discussed in terms 
of their vulnerability, but the port was not addressed. These are defined as those “that are critical 
to the health and welfare of the population and that are especially important following disasters.” 
The plan goes on to identify nine specific types of critical facilities: marinas, shelters, schools, 
hospitals, fire and rescue stations, police stations, water supply points, and rail road 
stations/airports. The port does not show up in this list, nor is it mentioned explicitly as a 
potential resource following a disaster, despite research that indicates role a port can play in post-
disaster recovery (Mileski and Honeycutt 2013). Similarly, the plan provides specific analysis for 
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“state owned/operated facilities,” but because the port is not state owned or operated, it received 
no explicit mention as warranting special consideration.  
Figure 19 -- Impacts mentioned in interviews vs. documents (Providence) 
The City of Providence Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (PEMA 2010) also addressed 
port issues, but the assessment focused primarily on terrorist attacks with respect to the port. The 
plan only notes that flooding poses a threat to shipping, port operations, business and property 
and that, “Uninterrupted port operations have economic benefits to the City.” It provides no 
further analysis, though does include a recommendation for the City of Providence to conduct 
further study of the port to, “Identify upgrades necessary to limit damage due to flooding and 
earthquake” and to “Retrofit the Port of Providence facility to protect against flood and 
earthquake damage.”  
The planning gap suggested in our findings is confirmed in part in a passage of the Hazards 
Chapter of Rhode Island’s Coastal Resources Management Program (CRMC 2011), that states 
this as an area of concern: 
Existing [planning] documents (either outdated or in draft form) do not 
adequately address or link to other plans to address hazard issues on the 
waterfront. This is problematic because of the unique hazards present in the port 
districts of Providence ... The port areas … carry major infrastructure and supply 
the region with critical goods, in both post- and pre-hazard conditions. Guidance 
could include evacuation of shore-side facilities, structural mitigation of shoreline 
structures, safe harbor recommendations, and boat pullout procedures and 
priorities, as well as address other concern issues such as spills, contamination 
caused by inundation, and facility closures. It should be noted additionally that 
new requirements for facility evacuation, import of supplies, emergency transport, 
etc. might be placed on this infrastructure in the case of a hazard scenario. 
Another aspect of the planning gap results from construction of existing infrastructure in the port 
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area being completed decades before appropriate land use and building codes took affect, as 
noted by the CRMC (2011). Much of that infrastructure still exists and is operational, despite 
designs that would not be up to today’s regulatory standards. However, even structures build in 
recent decades in accordance with current codes and regulations are not designed to withstand 
new environmental conditions likely to occur due to climate change. The results of analysis of 
interviews and documents in this case study indicate that the concerns of stakeholders and the 
potential impacts of a hurricane hitting the Port of Providence have not been addressed in the 
stakeholders’ formal planning documents. 
5.2.  Comparative	  assessment	  of	  Gulfport	  and	  Providence	   
This study was not designed to be a comparative cases study, as many variables differentiate 
these two ports (e.g., size, type of cargo, management structure, etc.). However, there are some 
overall observations that can be made between the two and they contribute to a deeper 
understanding of what happens to the port stakeholder cluster when the port suffers a major 
hurricane. In Providence, stakeholders identified many such potential impacts ex ante an actual 
storm event. We found many similarities and some marked differences between impacts noted in 
Providence and those noted ex post facto by stakeholders in Gulfport This section discusses first 
the similarities and then the differences between the two case studies. 
5.2.1. Similarities	  between	  Gulfport	  and	  Providence	  
In both case study ports, planning and policy documents addressed few of the concerns 
expressed by stakeholders. This was the case both in Gulfport, where the Mississippi State Port 
Authority (MSPA) was focusing on implementing a resilience strategy in response to a recent 
hurricane, and Providence, where no such effort existed, but there was a culture of leadership 
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around climate adaptation in the State.  
In Gulfport, post-storm impact assessments from Katrina addressed direct damages at the port 
and other impacts on a regional scale. These assessments provide information that can serve as a 
foundation for resilience plans, such as the one that was being undertaken for the Port of 
Gulfport. Though the MSPA had plans for a resilience strategy, the planning documents included 
little input from port stakeholders about storm impacts and few references to the many concerns 
identified in interviews. In Providence, no post-hurricane event impact assessments for the 
stakeholders had been conducted, due to the fact that no such event has taken place in their 
recent history. There were, however, vulnerability assessments conducted on statewide and 
citywide scales, but these did not specifically address the port or its stakeholders in detail. 
Although one university study done in Rhode Island identifies many of the consequences of a 
storm ex ante (in particular with respect to debris), most formal documentation either does not 
address the port directly or focuses primarily on emergency response. Neither interviews nor the 
documents in Providence identified any established process for identifying the wider impacts that 
a storm event would have on port stakeholders.  
Though Gulfport results showed a higher number of impacts cited overall, the trends were the 
same in both case studies. In both, the highest number were intangible consequences, followed 
by direct damages, and then indirect costs. Providence and Gulfport respondents identified a 
comparable number of intangible consequences and in both cases debris stood out as a top 
concern. All three of the individual impacts that were cited with the highest frequency fell into 
this category. In Providence, the top impacts mentioned most frequently in interviews were 
debris (11 times), pollution to the waterway (11 times), and disruption in energy supply (10 
times). The first two of these were each mentioned twice in the Providence planning documents. 
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In Gulfport, the top impacts mentioned most frequently were containers all over the city (20 
times), chicken and pork bellies all over the city (13 times), and debris polluting the environment 
(nine times). Cleanup of debris in and around the Port of Gulfport took more than six months 
after Katrina, explaining why this was a top concern (Miller and Birdsall 2010).	  	  
Like in Providence, Gulfport stakeholders felt concern over a very wide range of potential 
impacts resulting from a lack of resilience at the port. Like Providence, no formalized process 
existed to ensure that these concerns were recognized and incorporated into the planning process. 
The consequences of a hurricane hitting the port and the costs these events have for society as a 
whole suggest that bridging this planning gap would benefit all stakeholders. 
5.2.2. Differences	  Between	  Gulfport	  and	  Providence	  
While Providence interviewees tended toward more generality in their descriptions of potential 
impacts, Gulfport interviewees were more specific as they had prior and direct experience 
dealing with a hurricane at port. This resulted in a far greater number of total impacts mentioned 
in Gulfport than in Providence. Gulfport’s respondents and document review yielded far more 
specifics in the categories of direct damages and indirect costs. For example Providence 
interviewees mentioned a general, Damage to port equipment, while Gulfport interviewees 
mentioned the specifics of, Damage to cranes and Damage to the fencing system. Gulfport’s 
planning documents for port restoration also focused far more attention on direct damages than 
on the indirect costs or intangibles consequences. Given that Gulfport was still recovering from 
Hurricane Katrina at the time of the interviews, it is not surprising that they had a much higher 
awareness of some of these specific impacts.  
Worth noting is how little overlap there was between the specific impacts identified in the two 
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case studies. Of the 107 distinct impacts mentioned, only 17 occurred in both case studies. 
Though both ports face high hurricane exposure and both are small to medium sized ports, like 
all ports, they are quite different in terms of cargo handled, environmental conditions, 
management, and equipment. This finding suggests that, while it is difficult to generalize with 
respect to the unique ways that hurricanes impact port stakeholders, the overall trend of concern 
for higher proportions intangible consequences may hold true across all ports, though this 
requires further testing.  
Although the sample size for both Providence and Gulfport is small, we analyzed how internal 
stakeholders of the port considered impacts. Results in Section 5.1 suggest that the internal 
stakeholders of the Port of Gulfport have a much broader awareness of the full range of impacts 
than their counterparts in Providence This is likely because:  
1. Port of Gulfport is operated by a state port authority and thus more engaged with other 
stakeholders, and 
2. The experience with Katrina left the interviewees with a much more detailed 
understanding of what actually happens as a result of a major storm, suggesting that site 
visits between these two ports could be a way to share lessons learned. 
The preceding section provided some analysis comparing the results from the two case studies. 
We next take a big picture view of the broader implications this work has for planning and 
policy. 
5.3. Planning	  and	  Policy	  implications	  
This research was designed to contribute a better understanding of the nature of the climate 
change problem for one particular port stakeholder system in two case study ports. It does not 
allow for a detailed assessment of the many other factors, including: the magnitude of impacts, 
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how the impacts are linked,	   probability of the various impacts, their specific costs, how 
stakeholders prioritize their concerns, and many other issues that would be components of a 
thorough vulnerability assessment at the stakeholder scale. This exploratory study, rather, yields 
results that represent the diversity of consequences that stakeholders perceive to be of 
importance when a major storm hits a piece of infrastructure – in this case, the port. This case 
study lays the groundwork for future research on seaport resilience that can be conducted at a 
scale that is narrow enough to be able to trace impacts back to one source e.g., a port), but broad 
enough to recognize the role that the port plays for a wide variety of stakeholders. Two issues in 
particular, however, emerged as particularly relevant for planning and policy: a lack of 
leadership and a need for qualitative impact assessments for ports. These are discussed below in 
more detail.  
5.3.1. Leadership	  issues	  
This analysis revealed a lack of clarity around leadership issues for building long-term port 
resilience in both ports. In Providence, no clear leadership responsibility for building the 
resilience of the port emerged, even though the perceptions of consequences of underscore the 
critical nature of resilience planning. In Gulfport, documents and interviews indicated that 
resilience planning was left primarily to the port, but that the port’s planning process was driven 
predominantly by profit and job creation goals leaving some stakeholder concerns out of the 
planning process. Traditionally, port planning has taken place within the confines of the port 
operating business (often the port authority), with little input from other stakeholders.4 The task 
of enhancing the port’s resilience to a level that adequately protects all stakeholders, and thus the 
                                                            
4  In Europe, for example, a survey conducted by the European Sea Ports Organization found that only 17% 
of ports involved local communities and stakeholders in port development plans (Brooke 1991). 
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public interest, is likely beyond the means of any given port operator. Though there are strategies 
that fall within the mandate, jurisdiction, and missions of all organizations, a coordination of 
individual efforts would be necessary. A master planning effort would be one way to ensure that 
the implementation of individual strategies complemented each other and that moving toward 
resilience could occur in a coordinated fashion. 
The Port of Providence comprises a complex group of private and public entities. The port 
terminal itself, ProvPort, operated by a private company, does not have a strategic planning 
process that includes port resilience, nor does it have the financial or staff resources to invest in 
leading a climate adaptation effort that addresses storm resilience issues. The same holds for the 
many other smaller businesses that make up the Port of Providence. Since, overall, the Port of 
Providence provides a public good, the government is positioned to play a role in conducting 
vulnerability assessments, adaptation planning, and creating policy that leads to appropriate 
levels of resilience to protect the greater interests of society. However, much of the port falls 
outside of the jurisdictional authority of the state since it is located landward of the mean high 
tide line that delimits public and private property. Though some port lands are owned by the City 
of Providence, respondents indicated that the City stays mostly uninvolved in planning and 
operations.  
Research and academic organizations, such as the Coastal Resources Center (CRC) at the 
University of Rhode Island, are poised to facilitate assessment and planning at a stakeholder 
scale. On behalf of the CRMC, the CRC has facilitated similar processes in the past that resulted 
in changes across stakeholder groups. For example, a “Balancing Uses of the Working 
Waterfront” workshop brought stakeholders together to assess ways that seemingly conflicting 
uses could be better harmonized (CRC 2007). This effort resulted in changes to state and city 
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policy, business plans of independent firms, and the formation of a new stakeholder alliance 
group that now represents the common interest of waterfront businesses. Because the CRC 
served as a neutral facilitator, diverse stakeholders came together to share information freely and 
plan for mutually beneficial outcomes. A similar effort could help focus research and planning at 
the port stakeholder scale for	  adaptation	  planning.	   
5.3.2. Qualitative	  impact	  assessments	  
In Providence and Gulfport, many concerns expressed by stakeholders were not identified in 
planning and policy documents, suggesting a disconnect between how stakeholders perceive 
impacts and how official policy addresses these impacts. Categorizing, quantifying, and 
assessing impacts of natural disasters on specific sectors are daunting but critical components of 
disaster-mitigation planning (Canton 2008). Results indicate that planning and policy should 
consider more than traditional quantitative direct damage assessment by including qualitative 
assessment tools that address indirect costs and intangible consequences resulting from a 
hurricane at the port. While reducing the risk of direct damages also reduces the risk of many of 
the other impacts, a broader range of considerations would be appropriate, especially given 
climate change. Concerted efforts to include the full range of stakeholders in planning/policy for 
resilience could help bridge the gap between concerns and how they are accounted for in these 
documents. Even in Gulfport where Hurricane Katrina devastated the port, the resilience portion 
of the port’s strategic plan is largely overshadowed by the desire to expand operations, increase 
tonnage throughput and create jobs. 
These case studies did not seek to monetize or otherwise quantify the actual costs of impacts. 
Rather, they served to help identify and define perceptions around the nature of the problem that 
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climate change presents to stakeholders of the port as storms intensify and sea levels rise. Many 
of the impacts do not appear to be considered in stakeholder plans and policies for enhancing 
port resilience. The impacts reported most by stakeholders (intangible consequences) are those 
that appear least in the formal planning documents and also those that are most conducive to 
qualitative assessment. This gap leads to many questions, such as: Are the investments in 
resilience enhancement adequate to meet the needs of the full cluster of stakeholders? If the 
direct damages were mitigated, which indirect costs and intangible consequences would also be 
mitigated? Given how few of the stakeholders’ concerns are reflected in the port’s planning 
documents, how comfortable are the stakeholders with the level of resilience the port is 
planning?  
5.3.3. The	  issue	  of	  scale	  
Though we did not set out to address the question of “why” specifically these types of gaps may 
exist, analysis of interview data and documents suggest one potential reason: Planning gaps may 
result from both a mismatch of timescales and geographic scales, as port operators make 
investment decisions based primarily on the interest of the port as a business, while state and 
regional planning efforts do not address the port specifically enough to protect society’s long-
term interest in port functions. Port operators typically make investment decisions based on the 
best interest of port business on a 5-10 year time horizon, as found in a recent survey of port 
authorities perspectives on climate adaptation (Becker et al. 2012) and in descriptions of the 
strategic planning process for ports (Allen 2012; Dooms and Macharis 2003). Considering the 
impacts of strong hurricanes in the face of climate change, on the other hand, must include time 
horizons that are well beyond the 5-10 year range for the sake of both the business interests of 
the port and the interests of the other external stakeholders in the cluster.  
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In addition to the mismatched timescales, the geographic scales may be mismatched. For 
example, the port planning process tends to focus on the port business alone (very local scale), 
while the public policy planning process tends to be more regional in scale. The “stakeholder 
cluster” scale is between the two. This was evident in Gulfport where damage assessments were 
either regional or port-specific, but did not focus at the stakeholder cluster scale to examine the 
ways that damage to this one piece of infrastructure affected its many stakeholders. In 
Providence, there were regional assessments, but also none that addressed either the port cluster 
or the port specifically.  
5.4. Limitations	  and	  next	  steps	  
There are numerous next steps involved in effective planning for a future that includes more 
frequent and more intense storm events. One next step would be conducting a more formal risk 
analysis that allows for probabilities and specific costs to be assigned to the various impacts and 
asks stakeholders to prioritize and their level of concern. There are numerous tools that can aid in 
this decision support process (Haymaker and Chachere 2006) and similar exercises have begun 
to be carried out, though not at the port stakeholder-cluster scale described here (see for example 
the Port of San Diego 2013).  
The case studies, too, had several limitations. First, the sample size was relatively small, making 
it difficult to compare how different sectors of stakeholders felt concern about different types of 
impacts or how different types of stakeholders perceived strategies differently. Results did not 
assess how stakeholders prioritize the various impacts or strategies they mentioned. Just because 
an impact was mentioned twice, for example, does not necessarily mean that it is of greater 
importance than an impact only mentioned once. It would also be valuable to consider the 
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linkages between impacts, as reducing the vulnerability for one direct damage might offset 
multiple indirect costs and intangible consequences. Interview analysis also indicates some 
perception gaps in how different types of stakeholders consider impacts. For example, little 
concern was expressed for impacts on the environment or on the intermodal system with which a 
port interfaces. An assessment of how these gaps in perceptions align with jurisdictions and 
mandates would help ensure that all aspects of impacts are considered in future resilience plans. 
The impacts collected in this research were also generated from within the stakeholder cluster 
itself. There are likely additional impacts that were overlooked, but are nevertheless significant. 
Finally, the interviews did not specifically emphasize questions of strategy implementation, 
because, even though stakeholders identified potential strategies, they did not discuss who 
would/should take a leadership role, how effective the strategies would likely be, the suitable 
timeline for their implementation, and how they would be funded. These questions can be 
addressed through further work in these and other case study locations. 
Had interviewees been more specific, some of the intangible consequences may have been 
categorized as indirect costs. However, the interviewees tended to talk about impacts in very 
broad terms; thus it was difficult to determine which, if any, aspect of the impact could be 
quantified in financial terms. In many cases, coding their concerns with specificity was 
extremely difficult. For example, many interviewees made statements like, You’re going to have 
a lot of potential impacts to a lot of important resources that are really hard to [comprehend]. In 
some cases, follow up questions elicited more specificity, but many interviewees were vague 
when it came to details. This challenge, however, only underscores the necessity for the type of 
research undertaken in this case study so that potential impacts can be named, perceptions 
shared, and ultimately better planning and policy developed to address them.	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Assessing how stakeholders prioritize the various impacts was not covered in this study. Just 
because an impact was mentioned twice, for example, does not necessarily mean that it is of 
greater importance than an impact only mentioned once. It would also be valuable to consider the 
linkages between impacts, as mitigating one direct damage might offset multiple indirect costs 
and intangible consequences. A next step is to revisit the Port of Gulfport and ask stakeholders to 
prioritize and rank the relative value of the different impacts mentioned, as well as to trace the 
pathways between impacts. A network analysis tool could help determine which impacts stand 
out as central nodes from which other impacts result. 
Our interview analysis indicates some perception gaps in how different sectors of stakeholders 
consider impacts. For example, little concern was expressed for impacts on the environment or 
on the intermodal system with which ports interface. An assessment of how these gaps in 
perception align with jurisdictions and mandates would help identify areas that warrant more 
attention in planning. If, for example, federal entities show concern for environmental impacts 
but have no mandate or jurisdiction over the potential source of those impacts, then improved 
communications and planning could help address this disconnect.  
The impacts noted in this study are limited to the perceptions of those identified by the 
stakeholders within the port cluster itself. There may be other impacts that were either unknown 
or not identified by these stakeholders. An “expert analysis” by a group external to the 
stakeholder cluster could identify these other potential impacts. 
6. Conclusion	  
These two case studies utilized a grounded theory approach (to create impact names and 
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subcategories) combined with a deductive analysis approach (to determine broad categories in 
accordance with IPCC definitions) to create a categorization of impacts and an analysis of which 
stakeholders would likely bear the cost for each. Through a review of official documents and 
interviews with port stakeholders, we found that stakeholders perceived a wide variety of 
impacts and costs resulting from a hurricane hitting the port and that these impacts fell into the 
three broad categories defined by the IPCC (IPCC 2012). These include direct damages to the 
port (including the waterway and intermodal connections), indirect costs that can be quantified in 
economic terms and intangible consequences that cannot be easily quantified in economic terms.  
Interviews and planning/policy documents from Gulfport show that stakeholders perceive that 
storms at the port result in direct damage to the port itself, but also on the quality of life and 
business in the region, and the environment. Stakeholders described their experience with 
Hurricane Katrina and their concerns for another similar storm. Gulfport makes for an excellent 
case study because of its experience related to hurricane Katrina and the MSPA’s consideration 
of plans to rebuild in a more hurricane-resistant fashion. Many stakeholders' concerns did not 
appear in formalized documents that concerned planning and policy for the port. We also found 
that hurricane resilience was not a priority for respondents when it came to providing 
commentary and input to the port’s planning process. In the face of climate change, we suggest 
that port resilience plans consider not just the impacts on the port itself, but the impacts storms 
have on the wider port cluster. As seen in this study, the true costs of an event at the port are 
distributed amongst many stakeholders. The concerns expressed by stakeholders and the port’s 
decisions about resilience strategies suggest that stronger stakeholder engagement would help 
future resilience planning efforts.  
In Providence, the results from this study suggest that while a collective awareness around 
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hurricane impacts on port stakeholders exists amongst stakeholders, the port planning and policy 
documents include little guidance on port resilience generally, and explicitly mentioned only 
about half of all identified impacts. Neither the port operator, nor the external stakeholders of the 
port, addressed long-term resilience planning in their policies and plans in any detail, yet external 
stakeholders outside of the port are at risk for shouldering many costs associated with a lack of 
proper planning.  
Both cases show an overall trend of high levels of concern for intangible consequences and 
many costs that will be borne across the stakeholder cluster. Both also show gaps in how impacts 
are addressed through official planning and policy. These findings suggest that the diversity of 
impacts resulting from a hurricane hitting these ports, the increasing risk of these events due to 
climate change, and the potential costs to society, warrant that planners and practitioners more 
fully consider port resilience and hurricane impacts in future planning efforts and bridge the gap 
between perceptions and formalize planning/policy. We suggest that understanding how 
stakeholders, planners, and policy makers as a cluster perceive these impacts can lead to a 
greater emphasis on resilience planning for the port that benefits all stakeholders. 
END 
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Figure 14 -- Impacts by stakeholder group (Gulfport) 
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Figure 15 -- Impacts by stakeholder group (Providence) 
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Figure 16 -- Costs upon stakeholders (Gulfport) 
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Figure 17 -- Costs upon stakeholders (Providence) 
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Figure 18 -- Impacts mentioned in interviews vs. documents (Gulfport) 
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Table 1 -- Port of Gulfport statistics 
Throughput in 
tons 
Throughput 
in TEUs 
Primary 
freight 
Hurricane 
probability 
Highest 
recorded 
storm 
surge 
(Year) 
Last 
major 
storm 
# Of 
hurricanes 
1858-2009 
2,200,000 
(2011) 
216,156 
(2011) 
Containers 
Bulk 
Break-bulk 
High 30 feet 
(2005) 
2005 
(Katrina – 
Cat 3) 
25 
 
Table 2 -- Assessed damages to the Port of Gulfport (PEER 2006) 
Asset value prior to Hurricane Katrina $127,573,778 
Post-Katrina [2006] tonnage as compared to Pre-Katrina 
Tonnage for September -- December 2004 
69% 
Effect on staffing Retained 100% of staff 
Effect on revenues Decreased by 70% 
Types of [direct] damage Damaged or destroyed port 
buildings and warehouses; 
damaged warehouses;  
Direct damage assessment $50,556,175 
Anticipated source of funding for repairs (2006) Port funds, FEMA, and insurance 
 
Table 3 – Organizations consulted in Gulfport’s Environmental Assessment for port restoration 
 
 
Table 4 -- Timeline for port resilience strategies in Gulfport
List of Sources, Agencies and Persons Consulted [40 CFR 1508.9(b)] 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians-Tribal Historic Preservation Officer 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History 
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality-Air Quality Branch 
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality-Hazardous Waste Branch 
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality-Water Quality Branch 
Mississippi Department of Marine Resources 
Mississippi Department of Transportation 
Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, and Parks 
Mississippi Development Authority/CDBG Disaster Recovery Program 
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 
Mississippi State Port Authority 
Harrison County Board of Supervisors 
Harrison County Utility Authority 
City of Gulfport-Planning 
City of Gulfport-Floodplain Manager 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
U.S. Department of Agriculture-Natural Resources Conservation Service 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Mobile District 
U.S. Department of Interior-U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service 
U.S. Department of Commerce-National Marine Fisheries Service 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
BMI Environmental 
 
 
YEAR DECISION ACTION ACTORS 
1998 Expand port by 84 Acres  MSPA, MDA 
2003  Complete 2003 Master Plan 
AECOM, 
MSPA, 
Governor 
(Gov.) 
2003   Begin filling 60 of 84 acres as per 2003 Master Plan MSPA 
2005 HURRICANE KATRINA DESTROYS PORT 
2005 
Identify resilience strategies / 
revisit expansion plan 
Choose “Evacuation model” as 
resilience strategy 
 
Governor, 
MSPS, 
AECOM 
2006  MS applies for $600m funding from HUD to support restoration and resilience 
Gov., 
MSPA, 
MDA 
2006  
Update 2003 Master Plan and incorporate 
new evacuation model as resilience 
strategy 
Gov., 
MSPA, 
MDA, 
AECOM 
2007  MS obtains $600m for CDBG/HUD funding in support of Restoration Program Gov., MDA 
2007  
2007 – MSPA hires CH2M Hill to review 
and implement the revised 2007 Port 
Master Plan 
MSPA, 
CH2M Hill, 
Gov 
2007 
Review 2007 Master Plan 
Update, reject evacuation 
strategy and create new 25’ 
elevation strategy 
 
Gov., 
MSPA, 
MDA, 
CH2M Hill 
2007 
MSPA begins additional 
“Expansion Program” 
component be completed in 
conjunction with “Restoration 
Program” 
 
Gov., 
MSPA, 
MDA 
2010  MSPA and MDA conduct Environmental Assessment for Restoration Program 
 MSPA, 
MDA, HUD 
2010  MSPA and MDA conduct Environmental Impact Statement for Expansion Program 
MSPA, 
MDA, 
USACE 
2011  Complete 60 acre fill, begin 24 acre fill and elevation MSPA 
2012 Abandon plan to elevate port Redirect $140 million to channel dredging project MSPA 
Table 5 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Gulfport 
Stakeholders	   Organization	  interviewed	   Port	  interests	   Interv
iews	  
Internal	  Stakeholders	  
Internal	  port	  
stakeholders	  
Mississippi	  State	  Port	  Authority	  
(MSPA)	  
Make	  port	  an	  economic	  engine	  for	  the	  state,	  provide	  
jobs	  
3	  
Mississippi	  Development	  Authority	  
(MDA)	  
Make	  port	  an	  economic	  engine	  for	  the	  state,	  provide	  
jobs,	  oversee	  long-­‐term	  planning	  for	  port	  
1	  
CH2M	  Hill	  (Contracted	  by	  MSPA)	   Provide	  program	  management	  and	  support	  for	  
restoration	  project	  
1	  
External	  Stakeholders	  
External	  
economic/contractual	  
stakeholders	  
Port	  tenants	  (Chiquita,	  Dole,	  
Crowley,	  DuPont,	  Island	  View	  
Casino)	  
Port	  user,	  supply	  fruit	  to	  customers	   1	  
Steward	  Sneed	  Insurance	   Manage	  risk	  and	  protect	  port	  assets	   2	  
Kansas	  City	  Southern	  Railroad	   	   0	  
	  
	   	   	  
Public	  policy	  (federal)	  
US	  Coast	  Guard	  (USCG)	   Facilitate	  the	  navigational	  needs	  of	  the	  port	  and	  
shipping,	  facilitate	  storm	  operations	  
1	  
US	  Army	  Corps	  of	  Engineers	  
(USACE)	  
Facilitate	  maritime	  commerce,	  protect	  marine	  
resources,	  maintain	  ship	  channel	  	  
2	  
US	  Federal	  Emergency	  
Management	  Agency	  (FEMA)	  
Facilitate	  disaster	  preparation,	  mitigation,	  response,	  
and	  recovery	  
5	  
National	  Oceanic	  and	  Atmospheric	  
Association	  (NOAA)	  
Provide	  weather	  and	  climate	  data	   1	  
US	  Customs	   	   0	  
State	  Senate	  (Senator	  Wicker)	   	   0	  
Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	   	   0	  
	  
	   	   	  
Public	  policy	  (state)	  
Gulf	  Regional	  Planning	  Commission	   Long	  range	  planning	  for	  regional	  transportation	  
system	  
1	  
Gulf	  of	  Mexico	  Alliance	  (GOMA)	   Coastal	  community	  resilience	   1	  
Mississippi	  Emergency	  
Management	  Agency	  (MEMA)	  
Review	  port	  project	  applications	   3	  
Mississippi	  Department	  of	  
Transportation	  (MDOT)	  
Construction	  and	  maintenance	  of	  connecting	  
infrastructure	  
1	  
Mississippi	  Department	  of	  Marine	  
Resources	  (MDMR)	  
Activities	  at	  the	  port	  that	  impact	  coastal	  waters	  or	  
wetlands	  
3	  
	  
	   	   	  
Public	  policy	  (local)	  
Harrison	  County	  Civil	  Defense	   Facilitate	  local	  emergency	  response,	  including	  
evacuations	  
1	  
City	  of	  Gulfport	   Represent	  citizens	  of	  the	  city	  in	  port	  decisions	   1	  
Southern	  Mississippi	  Planning	  and	  
Development	  
Grant	  facilitation	  for	  transportation	  project	  adjacent	  to	  
port	  
1	  
	  
	   	   	  
Community	  groups	   STEPS	  Neighborhood	  Group	   Protect	  adjacent	  communities,	  advocate	  for	  jobs	  growth	  
1	  
 
Table 6 -- Stakeholders interviewed in Providence 
Stakeholders	   Organization	  
interviewed	  
Port	  interests	   Intervi
ews	  
Internal	  Stakeholders	  
Internal	  Stakeholders	   Waterson	   Terminal	  Services	   Generate	  profit	   3	  
External	  Stakeholders	  
Economic/contractual/
private	  firms	  
Univar	   Port	  tenant	   1	  Affiliated	  Insurance	  Managers	   Reduce	  risks	  and	  liability	   1	  Moran	  Shipping	  Agency	   Service	  port	  and	  users	   2	  Promet	  Marine	  Services	   Repairs	  to	  ships	  and	  docks	   1	  Marine	  Pilots	  Association	   Pilots	  all	  commercial	  traffic	  to/from	  the	  port	   0	  Rhode	  Island	  Oil	  Heat	  Institute	   Represent	  petroleum	  companies	  at	  the	  port	   0	  
	   	   	   	  
Public	  policy	  (Federal)	  
US	  Coast	  Guard	   Facilitate	   maritime	   commerce,	   protect	   marine	  
resources,	  maintain	  ship	  channel	  
1	  US	  Army	  Corps	  of	  Engineers	   Facilitate	   maritime	   commerce,	   protect	   marine	  resources,	  maintain	  ship	  channel	   2	  National	  Flood	  Insurance	  Program	   Facilitate	  disaster	  preparation,	  mitigation,	  response,	  and	  recovery	   1	  
	   	  	   	  	   	  
Public	  policy	  (State)	  
RI	  Coastal	  Resources	  Management	  Council	   Regulate	  coastal	  zone	   3	  RI	  Statewide	  Planning	   Transportation	  and	  land	  use	  planning	   1	  RI	  Economic	  Development	  Corporation	   Generate	  jobs,	  economic	  development	   1	  RI	  Dept.	  of	  Transportation	   Maintain/improve	  highways/bridges	   1	  RI	  Dept.	  of	  Env.	  Management	   Environmental	  concerns	   1	  RI	  State	  Senate	   	   1	  
	   	  	   	  	   	  
Public	  policy	  (local)	  
Providence	  Planning	  Dept.	   Promote	  city	  interests,	  generate	  taxes,	  zoning	   1	  Providence	  Emergency	  Management	  Agency	   Emergency	  response	   1	  Providence	  Fire	  Dept.	   Emergency	  response	   1	  	  
Community Save	  the	  Bay	   Protect	   adjacent	   communities,	   advocate	   for	   jobs	  growth	   1	  	  
Academic 
Brown	  University	   Provide	  research	  capabilities	   1	  RI	  Coastal	  Resources	  Center	   Provide	  research	  capabilities	   1	  URI	   Provide	  research	  capabilities	   1	  
 
Table 7 -- Documents reviewed from Gulfport 
 
 (Green background indicates document analyzed and coded) 
Title Author Sponsor organization Sector
Type of 
document Year
1 Gulfport Master Plan Update 2007 Final Report BDMJM Harris and AECOM MSPA Port and private Master Plan 2007
2
The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Mississippi’s 
Commercial Public Ports and Opportunities for 
Expansion of the Ports
PEER Mississippi Legislature
Public (local, state, 
regional) Report 2006
3 Hurricane Katrina Damage Assessment Report MSPA MSPA Port and private Damage assessment 2005
4 Port of Gulfport Restoration Program Action Plan MSPA MSPA Port and private Master Plan 2008
5 Master Planning the Port of Gulfport, Mississippi - Rebirth after Katrina John Webb MSPA Port and private Report 2007
6 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita - Implications for Hurricane Science and Engineering
Building and Fire 
Research 
Laboratory NIST
National Science 
Board Public (federal) Report 2006
7
Environmental Environmental Assessment and 
Environmental Review Record for Community 
Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Project at 
State Port at Gulfport
MSPA MDA Port and private Environmental Assessment 2010
8 Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge Reconnaissance Fritz et al Georgia Tech Academia and non-profit
Academic 
paper 2008
9 Read the Port of Gulfport's Restoration Program Description MSPA MSPA Port and private Press Release 2008
10 Sustainable Restoration of the Port of Gulfport Reilly Morse Mississippi Center for Justice
Academia and non-
profit Report 2011
11 The Plan for the Implementation of the Port of Gulfport Restoration Program CH2M Hill MSPA Port and private Master Plan 2010
12 Advancing in the Aftermath IV: Loren C. Scott Capital One N.A. Academia and non-profit Report 2007
13 Letter of opposition to HUD funding Multiple STEPS Academia and non-profit
Letter of 
opposition 2007
14 Maritime Severe Weather Contingency Port Plan USCG USCG Public (federal) Hazard mitigation plan 2010
15 Central Harrison County Connector Highway MDOT MDOT Public (local, state, regional) FAQ 2007
16 Testimony of Governor Haley Barbour Haley Barbour
Ad Hoc 
Subcommittee on 
Disaster 
Recovery
Public (local, state, 
regional) Testimony 2009
17 Port of Gulfport Restoration Program Presubmittal Meeting CH2M Hill MSPA Port and private Presentation 2009
18 State of Mississippi Hazard Mitigation Plan State of MS MEMA Public (local, state, regional)
Hazard 
mitigation plan 2007
19 Federal Disaster Recovery Grant Report MDA MDA Port and private Grant report 2011
20 Gulfport Restoration Program Action Plan - Amendment 5 - Modification 1 MSPA MSPA Port and private
Port planning 
document 2008
21 MSPA Current and Projected Jobs MSPA MSPA Port and private Report 2011
22 Question received on "request for ideas" proposal MSPA MSPA Port and private
Response to 
public 
comment
2010
23 The Projected Economic Impacts from Container Terminal Development at Gulfport TranSystems MSPA Port and private
Economic 
assessment 2011
24 Mississippi Unified Long-Range Transportation Infrastructure Plan MDOT MDOT
Public (local, state, 
regional) Transport Plan 2007
25 State of Mississippi Budget 2011
Joint Legislative 
Budget 
Committee
Joint Legislative 
Budget 
Committee
Public (local, state, 
regional) Budget 2011
26 Mississippi Pay Now, Pay Later: American Security Project
American 
Security Project
Academia and non-
profit Pamphlet 2011
27 Hurricane Katrina: Profile of a Super Cat Lessons and Implications for Catastrophe Risk Management
Risk Management 
Solutions
Risk Management 
Solutions Port and private Report 2005
28 Harrison County Flood Insurance Study FEMA FEMA Public (federal)
Flood 
insurance 
study
2009
29 Mississippi Coastal Analysis Project - Coastal Documentation and Main Engineering Report FEMA FEMA Public (federal) Report 2008
30 Mississippi Coastal Improvements Project, Interim Report USACE USACE Public (federal) Report 2006
31 City of Gulfport Budget 2011 City of Gulfport City of Gulfport Public (local, state, regional) Budget 2011
32 Harrison County Hurricane Surge Map FEMA FEMA Public (federal)
Flood 
insurance 
study
2009
DOCUMENTS NOT ANALYZED
Table 8 -- Documents reviewed in Providence 
(Green background indicates document was analyzed and coded)	  
Title Author Sponsor organization Sector
Type of 
document Year
DOCUMENTS ANALYZED
1
Natural Hazards: Hurricanes, Floods, and Sea 
Level Rise in theMetro Bay Region Special Area 
Management Plan
Pam Rubinoff Ri CRMC Public (local, state, regional) Policy 2009
2
Strategy for Reducing Risks from Natural Hazards 
in Providence, Rhode Island: A Multi-Hazard 
Mitigation Plan
City of Providence 
Local Hazard 
Mitigation 
Committee, Maguire 
Group, Inc.
Rhode Island 
Emergency 
Management 
Agency
Public (local, 
state, regional)
Hazard 
mitigation plan 2011
3 Bays, Rivers, and Watersheds Systems-Level Plan: 2009-1013 Ames Colt
Rhode Island 
Bays, Rivers, 
and Watersheds 
Coordination 
Team
Public (local, 
state, regional)
State planning 
document 2008
4 Promet Marine Services Hurricane Preparedness Checklist
Promet Marine 
Services
Promet Marine 
Services Port and private
Hazard 
mitigation plan 2011
5 Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
Providence 
Emergency 
Management 
Agency
Providence 
Emergency 
Management 
Agency
Public (local, 
state, regional) Report 2010
6 Rhode Island State Hazard Mitigation Plan
Rhode Island 
Emergency 
Management 
Agency
Rhode Island 
Emergency 
Management 
Agency
Public (local, 
state, regional)
Hazard 
mitigation plan 2009
DOCUMENTS NOT ANALYZED
7 Beyond No Regrets: Assessing the Economic Efficiency of Climate Adaptation in Rhode Island Kyle A. Polar
Brown 
University
Academia and 
non-profit Student Report 2010
8
Summary: Preliminary Assessment of Rhode 
Island's Vulnerability to Climate Change and its 
Options for Adaptation Action
Timmons Roberts et 
al
Brown 
University
Academia and 
non-profit Report 2010
9 Economic Effects of Allens Avenue Businesses FXM Associates
Providence 
Working 
Waterfront 
Alliance
Port and private Economic assessment 2008
10 National Infrastructure Protection Plan Unassigned
Dept. of 
Homeland 
Security
Public (federal) Planning document 2009
11 Rhode Island and Southeastern Massachusetts Area Contingency Plan
Rhode Island and 
Southeastern 
Massachusetts Area 
Committee
USCG Public (federal) Hazard mitigation plan 2010
12 Rhode Island Hurricane Evacuation Study Technical Report USACE USACE Public (federal) Report 1995
13 FY07 Economic Monitoring Report
Ri Economic 
Monitoring 
Collaborative
Ri Bays, Rivers 
and Watersheds 
Coordination 
Team
Public (local, 
state, regional) Report 2007
14 Rhode Island's Ports and Commercial Harbors: A GIS Inventory of Current Uses and Infrastructure Jennifer McCann
Rhode Island 
Statewide 
Planning
Public (local, 
state, regional) Report 2011
15 Rhode Island Pay Now Pay Later American Security Project
American 
Security Project
Academia and 
non-profit Pamphlet 2011
16 Natural Hazards and Flood Plain Management in Upper Narragansett Bay
Malcolm Spaulding, 
James Hu, 
Christopher Baxter
University of 
Rhode Island
Academia and 
non-profit Student Report 2007
Table 9 -- Table of direct damages 
 
Table 10 -- Table of indirect costs 
DIRECT'DAMAGES
KEY
I'='Mentioned'in'interviews
D'='Mentioned'in'documents
B'='Mentioned'in'interviews'AND'
documents
$'='Cost'borned'by'stakeholder'group
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Damage&to&wharfs,&docks,&and&berthing&
areas B B Damage&to&port&buildings&and&structures B
Boats'sinking'at'docks'and'cost'to'
remove'them $ $ $ I Damage'to'casino $ $ B
Damage'due'to'stress'on'vessel'mooring'
systems $ $ I Damage'to'fire'system'water'tower $ $ I
Damage'to'wharf,'piers,'docks $ B B Damage'to'LNG'and'LPG'tanks $ $ I
Fill'eroded'around'berths $ $ D Damage'to'parking'structure $ $ D
Rail'cars'ended'up'in'ship'berths $ $ $ $ I Damage'to'warehouses,'office,'structures $ $ B I
Damage&to&vessels&and&barges D Debris'causing'damage'to'structures $ $ D I
'Casino'barge'broke'free $ $ D Flooding'damage'to'buildings $ $ I I
Damage&to&port&utilities&and&systems B Fuel'tanks'breached $ $ I
Utility'damage'(general) $ $ D Roofs'blown'off $ $ I
Sewer'lines'down $ $ I Tanks'floating'free $ $ $ I
Power'loss $ $ I Warehouse'floors'blown'up'from'pressure $ $ I
Mechanical'and'electrical'system'damage $ $ D Damaged&freight&and&cargo B I
Damage'to'port'roads'and'rail'lines D Lost'or'damaged'freight'and'cargo $ B I
Damage&to&port&lands I Containers'washed'inland $ $ $ $ D
Damage'to'construction'projects'
underway $ $ I Damage&caused&by&debris&off&port&property B
Erosion'of'filled'land $ I Debris'field $ $ $ $ D
Damage&to&port&facilities&(general) B D Cost'to'clean'up'debris $ $ $ $ I
Total'losses'at'all'MS'ports'99.9'million $ $ $ D Containers'all'over'city $ $ $ $ I
Specific'port'damage'figures $ $ $ D Damage&off&port&property B
General'damage'mention $ $ $ D D Damage'to'offUport'roads'and'rail'lines $ $ B
Cost'of'rebuilding $ $ $ I Transportation'sector'(general) $ $ $ I
Damage&to&port&equipment B I
Fencing'system'damage $ D
Damage'to'port'equipment $ B I
Damage'to'cranes $ D
 INDIRECT(COSTS
KEY
I(=(Mentioned(in(interviews
D(=(Mentioned(in(documents
B(=(Mentioned(in(interviews(AND(
documents
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Lost%business%for%port%and%port%tenants
Tonnage(decline $ $ $ $ D
Lost(tenants $ $ $ B
Lost(revenue(to(port(businesses $ $ $ $ D
Casino(losses $ $ $ D
Delays%in%port3related%commerce%and%
increased%prices
Loss(of(facilities(at(port $ $ $ D
Downtime(after(storm $ $ $ $ I I
Cost(of(materials(goes(up(due(to(port(
shutdown $ $ $ $ I
Cost(to(rePdredge,(clear,(and(rePopen(
navigation(channel $ $ $ B
Port(closed(to(navigation $ $ $ I I
Navigation(channel(closed $ $ I
General(business(continuity(problems $ $ $ B
Fisheries(losses $ I
Debris(impacts(to(navigation $ $ $ I
Cleanup%costs,%emergency%workers,%
emergency%services,%etc.
Housing(costs(for(relief(workers $ $ $ I
Costs(to(the(state((cleanup,(emergency(
services,(etc.) $ I
Costs(to(replace(buoys(moved(off(station $ I
Other%hurricane3related%costs%for%port%and%
tenants
Port(evacuation(cost $ $ $ I
Overtime(pay $ $ $ $ I
Lawsuits(against(the(port(and(tenants $ $ $ I
Insurance(costs(going(up $ $ $ I
Carriers(need(to(move(equipment(to(
other(ports $ $ I
Positive%spillovers
Accelerated(redevelopment(and(opened(
markets $ $ $ D
New(business(can(result(from(
catastrophic(event $ $ I
Table 11 -- Table of intangible consequences 
 
 
 
 
INTANGIBLE)CONSEQUENCES
KEY
I)=)Mentioned)in)interviews
D)=)Mentioned)in)documents
B)=)Mentioned)in)interviews)AND)
documents
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Labor&and&employment&consequences Consequences&of&debris
)Workers)stranded)at)port ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ I )Debris)in)waterway)obstructs)navigation)and)hinders)dredging ✓ ✓ I B
)Unemployment)insurance)lost ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ I )Debris)gets)reported)and)recorded)causing)paperwork)logjam ✓ ✓ i
)Lost)jobs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ D )Debris)from)port)ends)up)as)battering)ram)causing)other)damage ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ I
)Fluctuations)in)supply)and)demand)of)
labor)pool ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ I
)Debris)damming)up)marshes)and)wetlands)
and)preventing)normal)tidal)flushing ✓ ✓ I
)Emotional)toll)on)staff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ I )Debris)as)pollution ✓ ✓ I
General&disruptions&to&sense&of&normalcy&
and&quality&of&life
)Debris)as)negative)impact)on)residential)
quality)of)life ✓ ✓ I
)Population)shifts ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ I )Debris)as)a)general)problem ✓ ✓ B B
)Disruption)of)energy)supplies)(LNG,)LPG,)
Fuel) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ I I
Consequence&for&the&local&and&regional&
economy&from&losing&port&functionality
Scale)of)disaster)is)overwhelming ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ I )Supply)chain)interruptions ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ I I
Environmental&damages&to&waterways,&
ecosystems,&and&coastal&land&resulting&
from&release&of&materials&stored&at&port
)Role)of)ports)in)state)economy ✓ ✓ D
)Pollution)to)bay)or)waterway ✓ ✓ I B )Lost)jobs)devastate)local)economy ✓ ✓ I
)Hazardous)materials)impacting)
sediments ✓ ✓ I )Local)economy)suffers)(general) ✓ ✓ I
)Loss)of)coastal)wetlands)and)ecosystems)
damages ✓ ✓ ✓ I I Lost)jobs)devastate)local)economy I
)Coastal)land)damages ✓ ✓ ✓ I Small)businesses)forced)out)of)business)due)to)recovery)costs I
Cement)into)the)channel ✓ ✓ I Business&operational&burdens
Coal)washed)into)water ✓ ✓ I )Operations)continuity ✓ ✓ I
Contamination)caused)by)inundation ✓ ✓ D )Lost)business)records ✓ ✓ B
Liquid)asphalt)into)the)waterway ✓ ✓ I )Forced)to)work)from)temporary)facilities ✓ ✓ B
Difficulty&in&planning&and&development Long)recovery)times ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ I
)PreYstorm)business)plans)derailed ✓ ✓ I Port)facility)closures ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ D
)Fluctuations)in)freight)patterns ✓ ✓ I Disruption&of&critical&services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Difficulties&in&obtaining&insurance Destruction)of)energy)infrastructure ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ D
)Risks)become)uninsurable ✓ ✓ I I Disruption)of)regional)energy)distribution ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ D
)Moratorium)on)new)insurance)policies ✓ I Interruption)of)critical)goods)supply ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ D
Damage&at&the&port&prevents&more&
efficient&disaster&response&for&region ✓ ✓ Interruption)of)essential)services ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ D
Can't)use)port)for)as)recovery)and)
response)platform)to)aid)region ✓ ✓ I D Interruption)of)power)supply ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ D
Debris)hampers)emergency)and)repair)
crews ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ D
Surveying)and)navigation)recovery)
equipment)in)short)supply ✓ ✓ I
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